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ABSTRACT 
The article explores how Member States respond to the challenge of complying with 
EU law obligations, whilst remaining alert to the demands of domestic politics in the 
context in contentious areas of EU competence. The article argues that in the case of 
free movement we can see the United Kingdom drawing upon three overlapping 
strategies in order to tread the fine line ‘between law and political truth’: it exploits 
as much as possible any uncertainties within free movement law; it draws upon the 
proximate field of domestic immigration law in order to reinterpret free movement 
law; and it argues for new resources to be brought into the field of free movement, 
in particular resources which restrict the freedoms of Member States. A discursive 
frame of migration governance provides the analytical construction within which 
the argument is located. The article is therefore a contribution to debates about 
(legal) Europeanisation and compliance, as well as the more specific challenges 
facing the UK in the latter half of the 2010s, namely a renegotiation of and 
referendum on EU membership. 
 
KEYWORDS 
Citizenship, free movement, Europeanisation, compliance, Member State, 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
This article explores some of the legal responses given by Member States to the 
challenge of dealing with a field of EU law and policy that has become contentious at 
national level. It focuses on the case study of the free movement of persons in the 
context of the United Kingdom, with limited references to examples drawn from 
other Member States. Against the background of apparently unprecedented popular 
opposition to immigration generally and to (at least some aspects of) EU free 
movement specifically, this article examines three strategies that a Member State 
government can pursue if it wants to somehow change or limit the present legal 
effects of the free movement of persons (with consequent political messages 
delivered to attentive audiences), while remaining broadly compliant with its 
responsibilities under the Treaties. These strategies involve: exploiting the internal 
resources of EU law; importing new resources into EU law, for example, by making 
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use of the proximity between free movement law and national immigration law; and 
attempting to change the resource base by bringing about amendments to existing 
EU law, or at least to EU law as it applies to the UK (e.g. through opt-outs) (see Part 
IV). I argue that in the case of the UK, these strategies are sustained, in many cases, 
through a discursive focus on the proximity between ‘free movement’ and 
‘immigration’, and between EU free movement law and national immigration law. 
This is combined with the use of residence tests in relation to various welfare 
benefits, in order to sort the population between those who are entitled and those 
who are not – one of several strategies to separate the ‘good’ migrant and the ‘bad’ 
migrant. While not strictly measures of immigration law, in practice rules governing 
entitlement to benefits will have a significant impact on the migrant experience, 
whether under UK immigration law or EU free movement law. 
 By pursuing these strategies, national governments and officials such as 
ministers can speak more effectively to the various competing audiences that 
demand action or change (or inaction) of different kinds. They can combine an 
appeal to populist politics with rule of law compliance, as required by the European 
Commission as the first level guardian of EU free movement law and as mandated by 
judgments of the Court of Justice. In such a manner, a government can navigate a 
pathway between what I term in this paper ‘law and political truth’ – that is, 
between the competing demands of the rule of law and compliance with EU law on 
the one hand, and a political reality (to be found in both public opinion and the 
public sphere) which appears to be profoundly anti-immigration and even 
sometimes anti-immigrant on the other.1 
 The argument is developed as follows. In Part II, I examine the shifting 
political and economic context for the evolution of free movement law in the 
European Union, both at the EU level and at the national level. Part III provides the 
                                                        
* School of Law / Institute for Advanced Studies in the Humanities, University of Edinburgh. 
Contact: jo.shaw@ed.ac.uk and @joshaw. Earlier versions of this article were presented at 
the UACES Conference in Cork, Ireland, September 2014 and the IMISCOE/EUI Conference 
on Mobilities, Florence, Italy, January 2015. I am grateful to the participants at those 
conferences and to the Editors of the Yearbook for their comments. The article draws on the 
results of two earlier projects: (1) an empirical research project which looked at the frictions 
between UK immigration law and EU free movement law entitled Friction and Overlap 
between EU Free Movement Rules and Immigration Law in the United Kingdom, Nuffield 
Foundation (Grant No.OPD/36198). Final report: J Shaw, N Miller and M Fletcher, Getting to 
Grips with EU Citizenship: Understanding the Friction Between UK Immigration Law and EU 
Free Movement Law, Research Report, 2013, 
http://www.frictionandoverlap.ed.ac.uk/files/1693_fullreportlowres.pdf); (2) a programme 
of work undertaken with Niamh Nic Shuibhne as Joint General Rapporteurs on Union 
Citizenship for the XXVI FIDE Congress, Copenhagen, May 2014. See N Nic Shuibhne and J 
Shaw, ‘General Report’ in U Neergaard, C. Jacqueson and N. Holst-Christensen (eds), Union 
Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges (DJØF Publishing, 2014). Notwithstanding 
the collective nature of these projects, all remaining infelicities are mine alone. 
1  This is a variation on a comment by DP Hodges that politicians find themselves trapped, in 
relation to immigration between ‘absolute and political truth’. D Hodges, ‘Britons have 
become scared of the wider world’, Daily Telegraph, 5 August 2014, 
http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/news/danhodges/100282452/britons-have-become-scared-
of-the-wider-world/; see further below note 34 
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analytical framework for the case study focused on the UK. The article makes use of 
scholarly approaches which have framed EU free movement within the wider 
context of migration governance, looking at both intra-EU mobility (free movement) 
and immigration into the EU. At the same time, it also builds on strands in the 
Europeanisation and compliance literatures, which have focused, in recent years, on 
how Member States respond to those judgments given by the Court of Justice which 
require the adjustment of national law, sometimes in quite dramatic ways, and on 
how and why states often find means of complying in creative ways.2 But national 
governments respond not only to CJEU judgments, but also to a range of other 
measures, including the underlying Treaties and legislation, as well as enforcement 
steps taken by the European Commission, not to mention the case law of national 
courts. In that sense, this article develops the creative compliance argument beyond 
the realm of compliance with judgments. Part IV then develops a case study focused 
on three strategies that national governments can pursue within the framework of 
migration governance before Part V offers some brief conclusions. 
 
II. WHAT FUTURE FOR THE FREE MOVEMENT OF PERSONS IN THE EUROPEAN 
UNION? 
EU free movement law is as old as the European integration process. The Treaty of 
Rome put in place the basic provisions that still govern the common or single 
market, under the current treaties (Treaty on European Union and Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union), including the free movement of workers, 
freedom to provide services and freedom of establishment, alongside the other 
freedoms (goods and capital), as well as the right to non-discrimination on grounds 
of nationality. Even before the expiry of the transitional period at the end of 1969, 
important legislative measures were adopted to facilitate the substantive and 
procedural aspects of free movement, including freedom of movement for family 
members.3 Since that time, numerous additional measures have been adopted, 
notably the so-called Citizens’ Rights (or ‘Free Movement’) Directive of 2004 which 
updates and upgrades free movement rights in important ways. It institutes a status 
of permanent residence for those resident for five years or longer, and has further 
enhanced protections against deportation in particular for those resident ten years 
or longer.4 However, it is not a complete code, and has encountered implementation 
difficulties at the national level, and interpretation challenges in the Court of 
                                                        
2  E.g. M Blauberger, ‘With Luxembourg in mind ... the remaking of national policies in the face 
of ECJ jurisprudence’, (2012) 19 Journal of European Public Policy 109, M. Blauberger, 
‘National Responses to European Court Jurisprudence’, (2014) 37 West European Politics 
457, S. Schmidt, ‘Judicial Europeanisation: The Case of Zambrano in Ireland’, (2014) 37 West 
European Politics 769. 
3  Directive 64/221/EEC on the co-ordination of special measures concerning the movement 
and residence of foreign nationals which are justified on grounds of public policy, public 
security or public health, [1963-1964] OJ Sp. Ed. Series I Chapter P0117; Council Regulation 
(EEC) 1612/68 on freedom of movement for workers within the Community, [1968(II)] OJ 
Sp. Ed. Series I Volume P475 – 484. 
4  Directive 2004/38/EC of the Council and European Parliament on the right of citizens of the 
Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the 
Member States [2004] OJ L158/77. 
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Justice.5 
 Supplementing this material, 1993 saw the introduction of ‘citizenship of the 
Union’ was enshrined in the EU treaties. This gives a ‘constitutional’ timbre to the 
principles of free movement and non-discrimination, and carries EU law away from 
the original focus on freedom of movement as applicable in relation to (economic) 
factors of production alone.6 EU citizenship gives rise to questions about precisely 
where the edges of ‘free movement’ lie. As the Court of Justice has told us on 
innumerable occasions, ‘citizenship is intended to be the fundamental status of the 
nationals of the Member States’.7  But how far does this go? Does citizenship protect 
only completed movement, or does it include also anticipated movement? What 
solidarity should exist amongst the Member States to support those EU citizens who 
require shorter or longer term support from welfare benefits or personal care 
consequent upon disability or ill health. Is an EU citizen who commits a crime no 
longer to be regarded as a legitimate beneficiary of the rules, even if he or she has 
family in the host Member State? In recent years, the twists and turns of the Court of 
Justice’s case law have been hard even for experts to follow. 
 But the problems go beyond the sphere of legal doctrine. Referencing one of 
the foundational documents of the European Communities, the Spaak Report,8 a 
2014 editorial in a leading EU law journal raised a pertinent question that is central 
to the future of the EU as an economic, political and legal integration project: ‘[H]as 
[Paul-Henri] Spaak’s dream of free movement [of persons] become a nightmare – 
legally over-complicated, politically abused, allegedly costly and popularly 
misunderstood?’9 
 It is certainly true that the scale of EU free movement has risen, and as it has 
done so, the issues that it raises have become more contested. The numbers of EU 
citizens taking advantage of EU free movement rights are now somewhat higher 
than before the 2004 enlargement.10 As the EU has now acquired a total population 
of over half a billion people across 28 Member States,11 the numbers of ‘free movers’ 
actually sound quite large when set against the population of the smaller Member 
States (around 14.3m in 2014).12 The population of EU free movers is also spread 
                                                        
5  A detailed commentary on EU free movement law, or on Directive, lies beyond the scope of 
this article. For further details, see S Peers, E Guild and J Tomkin, The EU Citizenship 
Directive. A Commentary, (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
6  See J Shaw, ‘Citizenship: contrasting dynamics at the interface of integration and 
constitutionalism’, in P Craig and G de Búrca (eds), The Evolution of EU Law, 2nd ed (Oxford 
University Press, 2011). 
7  E.g. in Ruiz Zambrano, Case C-34/09, ECLI:EU:C:2011:124 at para 41. 
8  Intergovernmental Committee on European Integration, The Brussels Report on the General 
Common Market (abridged, English translation of document commonly called the Spaak 
Report), June 1956, Archive of European Integration, http://aei.pitt.edu/995/.  
9  Editorial Comments, ‘The free movement of persons in the European Union: Salvaging the 
dream while explaining the nightmare’, (2014) 41 Common Market Law Review 729 at p 736. 
10  M Benton and M Petrovic, How Free is Free Movement? Dynamics and Drivers of Mobility 
within the European Union, MPI Europe, March 2013. 
11  See the data at http://europa.eu/about-eu/facts-figures/living/index_en.htm.  
12  See the most recent data at http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Migration_and_migrant_population_statistics (updated in May 2015 
with most data referring to January 2014) and with more details (but older figures) on a 
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unevenly: of those 14.3m, more than one third are in just two Member States, with 
around 2.5m non-national EU citizens in the UK, and over 3m in Germany. None the 
less, ‘free movers’ (beyond those who undertake temporary cross border 
movement) remain a small percentage of the total population. Overall fewer than 
three per cent of EU citizens are resident outside the Member State of which they 
hold citizenship. Only in Luxembourg and Cyprus does the population comprise 
more than ten per cent EU citizens from other Member States, and in most Member 
States the numbers of non-national EU citizens is smaller, or much smaller, than the 
numbers of third country nationals. In 2012, non-national EU citizens made up 
around seven per cent of the total employed population across the Member States.13 
 Yet despite these relatively small numbers, free movement rights have 
gained unprecedented salience with national publics. They are now seen in a 
number of Member States as a problem that needs to be addressed. It is true that 
few Member States can muster the outright hostility that can be seen emanating 
from the government14 and the media in the UK,15 which has also led some sections 
of the commentariat to suggest that free movement might need, in certain ways, to 
be moderated16 and has resulted in free movement being an element in the UK 
Government’s 2015-2016 re-negotiation strategy, with a view to a UK referendum 
on membership of the EU. But none the less a number of other governments 
(Austria, Germany, Netherlands) have been prepared to back the UK Government up 
on issues such as alleged ‘abuses’ of EU law, and the phenomenon of ‘poverty 
migration’ as it is termed in Germany, or benefit tourism as it appears in the UK 
discourse.17 And in Belgium, where there has been a marked acceleration in the 
numbers of EU citizens seeing their residence permits removed because they are 
                                                                                                                                                                     
wider variety of cross border activities: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/EU_citizenship_-_statistics_on_cross-border_activities.  
13  For further details see http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-14-9_en.htm, 
http://epthinktank.eu/2013/07/09/migration-in-the-eu/ and 
http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/16/freedom-of-movement-and-residence-of-eu-citizens-
access-to-social-benefits/.  
14  E.g. D Cameron, ‘Free movement needs to be less free’, Financial Times, 26 November 2013, 
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/add36222-56be-11e3-ab12-
00144feabdc0.html#axzz39YJSsk5W, referring to ‘vast migrations’. 
15  T Horsley and S Reynolds, ‘United Kingdom’, in U Neergaard, C. Jacqueson and N. Holst-
Christensen (eds), Union Citizenship: Development, Impact and Challenges (DJØF Publishing, 
2014). Examples of poor treatment of new Member States in particular include the Daily 
Telegraph describing the Visegrad countries in 2013 as ‘EU accession countries’, 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10484225/Eastern-European-
immigrants-overwhelming-benefit-UK-economy.html.  
16  See, for example, the work of David Goodhart discussed below at n131 in the context of his 
submission to the Balance of Competences Review report on free movement, and the weight 
placed upon this work by the report. 
17  Letter to the Irish Presidency from the Ministers of the Interior of Austria, Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, April 2013 http://docs.dpaq.de/3604-
130415_letter_to_presidency_final_1_2.pdf. For further analysis see M Blauberger and S 
Schmidt, ‘Welfare migration? Free movement of EU citizens and access to social benefits’, 
Research & Politics, (2014) October-December 1, doi:10.1177/2053168014563879. 
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deemed to have become ‘unreasonable burdens’ on the social system,18 the Minister 
declared in December 2013 that ‘ll faut éviter qu'il y ait des gens qui profitent de 
notre système social’.19 
 But the picture is not all negative. If we were to define free movement as 
mobility with transaction costs reduced20 it would be easy to see why it is also 
amongst the achievements of the EU most prized by EU citizens, according to 
Eurobarometer polls.21 Thus free movement manages to be simultaneously both 
prized and feared. Accordingly, just as there are some states setting out to challenge 
the shibboleth of free movement, so it has a number of prominent defenders, 
notably many governments amongst the states of Central and Eastern Europe22 and 
the Nordic states.23 
 In sum, free movement is now a heavily contested issue among governments 
and other stakeholders within the EU and its Member States, after decades of 
relative quiescence, where this field of EU law largely flew below the radar and 
attracted little public attention. 
 There are a number of reasons that contribute to this changed political 
constellation. They include the impact of the 2004 and 2007 enlargements towards 
the states of Central and Eastern Europe which have undergone economic transition 
since 1989 (and in particular the different decisions taken by Member States around 
transitional periods) and the economic downturn experienced to a greater or less 
degree by all Member States in the aftermath of the financial crisis, and especially in 
those Member States where the financial crisis turned into a sovereign debt crisis.24 
This, in turn, necessitated the imposition of swingeing austerity measures, often at 
the behest of international institutions such as the IMF and the ECB, as well as the 
European Commission. These factors, combined with unemployment throughout 
Europe, but especially in the east and south of the EU, and very low growth rates in 
some of the ‘old’ Member States (e.g. France and Italy) as well as in those states 
whose economies have contracted dramatically because of the sovereign debt crisis, 
have resulted in EU citizens taking advantage of their free movement rights to a 
greater extent than before. We have seen mobility both from east to west and south 
                                                        
18  See J-M Lafleur and M Stanek, ‘Restrictions in Access to Social Protection of Mobile Citizens 
in Times of Crisis: the case of EU citizens expelled from Belgium’, IMISCOE/EUI Conference, 
Mobility in Crisis, January 2015.  
19  ‘We must ensure that people do not profit from our welfare system’, 
http://www.rtl.be/info/belgique/politique/maggie-de-block-il-faut-eviter-que-des-gens-
profitent-de-notre-systeme-social-video--396658.aspx (trans. Shaw). 
20  J Hampshire, ‘Millions on the Move’, The World Today, August-September 2014, 13 at p 14. 
21  Eurobarometer value of free movement 
22  Migrants from Central and Eastern Europe have been hugely beneficial for the British economy, 
Joint Statement on the Free Movements of Persons by the Foreign Ministers of the Visegrad 
countries – Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia, November 2013, reproduced at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&f=ST%2017395%202013%20INIT. 
23  ‘In times of crisis, we must safeguard free movement’, Letter to the Financial Times from the 
EU Affairs Ministers of Sweden, Finland and Norway, 16 January 2014. 
24  See Benton and Petrovic, above note 10. 
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to north,25 including the return of some of those who had previously exercised their 
free movement rights to their home states, although perhaps not as much new 
mobility as might have been expected given the severity of the crisis and the levels 
of unemployment in some states.26 For some observers, a more mobile European 
workforce remains an imperative for Europe to work its way out of the crisis that 
continues to affect countries such as Greece.27 
 The particular factors affecting the EU have, moreover, also coalesced with 
broader concerns amongst electorates in the Member States regarding immigration 
more generally (including fears about the apparent lack of integration on the part of 
certain migrant communities which become linked in the public imagination to 
security concerns) which have led to increasing votes for anti-immigration and 
indeed anti-immigrant political parties. There is, furthermore, a perception that the 
EU’s own liberalization of service sectors has opened up possibilities for 
exploitation of pay and conditions differentials across the Member States by 
transnational corporations evading host state labour regulation requirements by 
‘posting’ workers employed under home state conditions.28 In that context, 
globalisation is a dirty word, and the EU’s own single market is seen as complicit in 
this process of undermining the social compacts within individual Member States to 
the detriment of organised labour and ‘ordinary working people’. Altogether, this 
amounts to a perfect storm in which free movement rights come to be seen as part 
of the problem (of a loss of sovereignty) rather than an element of the solution 
(through a pooling of sovereignty to combat challenges collectively rather than 
individually). 
 
III. A CONTINUUM OF ‘MIGRATION GOVERNANCE’ 
                                                        
25  ‘Germany revealed as main destination of EU migrants, as Poland vows to veto UK’, The 
Independent, 2 December 2014, 
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/germany-revealed-as-main-
destination-of-eu-migrants-as-poland-vows-to-veto-uk-9897327.html. See R Verwiebe, ‘New 
forms of intra-European migration, labour market dynamics and social inequality in Europe’, 
(2014) 11 Migration Letters 125. 
26  E Recchi and J Salamońska, ‘Bad Times at Home, Good Times to Move? The (Not So) 
Changing Landscape of Intra-EU Migration’, in V Guiraudon, C Ruzza and H-J Trenz (eds), 
Europe's Prolonged Crisis. The Making or the Unmaking of a Political Union (Palgrave, 2015). 
27  ‘At the height of the Euro crisis there were times when more young Irish citizens were 
leaving their little homeland in search of work than all the Spanish and Italians together. … 
Workforce mobility is the only outlet for economic pressure, the only means that can 
halfway ensure that unemployment rates in the Eurozone converge instead of diverge. 
Europeans will have to emigrate from Helsinki to Brindisi just as naturally as they do from 
Hamburg and Berlin. In the absence of a transfer union, mobility should be significantly 
higher than it is in the US - and yet it is much lower. ... What we urgently need, also in 
Germany, is a new policy on mobility: a policy that actively promotes language learning and 
job placements across Europe’, from ‘Her mit den neuen Gastarbeitern!’, Die Welt, 19 July 
2015,  http://www.welt.de/print/wams/debatte/article144181397/Her-mit-den-neuen-
Gastarbeitern.html (English translation from 
http://www.eurotopics.net/en/home/presseschau/archiv/article/ARTICLE166613-
Eurozone-needs-more-mobile-workforce).  
28  See P Delivet, The Free Movement of People in the European Union: principle, stakes and 
challenges, Robert Schuman Foundation Policy Paper, European Issues, No. 312, May 2014. 
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Against this background, should we assume that the problems (and thus also the 
solutions) relating to free movement lie in the sphere of politics and economics, and 
that those who hark back to the principles of EU free movement law and try to argue 
that free movement is somehow ‘different’ to ‘ordinary’ immigration, as it is 
regulated by the treaties and legislation under a framework of economic integration, 
are just hopeless romantics?29 Do we now have to accept that whatever EU law 
might say at present, the free movement project has to be regarded as politically 
untenable in an enlarged EU, where free movement is generally constructed in the 
public imagination in the same way as immigration from third states? Can the 
situation only be recovered – from the perspective of governments and politicians – 
if states can regain that elusive control over free movement to the same extent that 
they seek to exercise it over many aspects of immigration from third states?30 In 
other words, is free movement just an anachronism that will disappear in a 
‘reformed’ EU, because it is no longer acceptable to public opinion? More pertinently 
for the UK, might we see the UK leave the EU after the referendum vote which is 
now scheduled following the victory of the Conservative Party in the 2015 General 
Election? It could be that this referendum could end up being contested largely 
around the axes of public hostility to and perceptions of immigration. 
 ‘Control’ is a significant axis of the debate in the UK, and this extends to EU 
free movement as much as to immigration from third countries. It was an important 
leitmotiv in David Cameron’s November 2014 speech on immigration: 
People have understandably become frustrated. It boils down to one word: 
control. People want government to have control over the numbers of people 
coming here and the circumstances in which they come. … People want a 
grip. I get that. They don’t want limitless immigration and they don’t want no 
immigration. They want controlled immigration and they are right.31 
Of course, there can be legitimate debate over whether free movement is indeed 
unlimited and uncontrolled in the way that it is sometimes portrayed in popular 
discourse and in the media. In fact, as EU lawyers and others familiar with EU affairs 
well know, it is more accurate to state that free movement is subject to a complex 
set of regulations distinguishing between different categories of beneficiaries, and 
allowing certain exceptions for public policy and security reasons, as well as reasons 
                                                        
29  It is not only EU lawyers who seek to insist on the difference between ‘free movement’ and 
‘immigration’. Proponents of the distinction include sociologists such as A Favell: ‘The UK 
has been one of the main beneficiaries from free movement of labour in the EU’, LSE EUROPP 
Blog, 1 July 2014, http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2014/07/01/the-uk-has-been-one-of-
the-main-beneficiaries-from-free-movement-of-labour-in-the-eu/.  
30  Of course scholars of migration have regularly exposed the lack of control which politicians 
and bureaucrats have over many aspects of immigration control in modern democratic 
states, and thus the gap between rhetoric and messy reality: C Boswell, ‘Migration control 
and the surveillance myth’, Policy Network, January 23 2011, http://www.policy-
network.net/pno_detail.aspx?ID=3940.  
31  Prime Minister’s Speech at JCB Staffordshire, 28 November 2014, 
https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/jcb-staffordshire-prime-ministers-speech. The 
webpage notes that the speech contains proposals made as leader of the Conservative Party 
during the 2010-2015 Coalition Government. 
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related to welfare solidarity.32 A full exposition of this point lies beyond the scope of 
this article. But arguments with a sufficient degree of subtlety to capture those 
complexities rarely have much traction in public opinion. Nor do ‘facts’33 about the 
contribution of migrants to the economy and to taxation, including their 
employment rate, their relative lack of reliance upon public services, and the paucity 
of evidence about their impact on the employment and wages of ‘native’ workers. 
 As a result, politicians are trapped, as the media commentator D.P. Hodges 
puts it, between ‘absolute and political truth’:  
It’s easy to blame the mainstream party leaders for their vacillation and 
duplicity over immigration. They either find themselves accused of being 
party to a reactionary “arms race” on the subject, or of having a tin ear to a 
rising tide of public anger. But in reality they are trapped between absolute 
and political truth…. They know that migrant labour, at all levels of the 
economy, is vital to Britain’s prosperity. They have seen the OBR [Office for 
Budgetary Responsibility] statistics that immigration is crucial to the 
recovery. And they know too that no one wants to hear it. That negative 
perceptions of the social, cultural and economic impact of migration are so 
embedded as to make any attempt to reverse them political folly.34 
One response to this trap has been to call for ‘fair movement not free movement’,35 
although it is rare to find evidence about how free movement under such conditions 
is actually unfair to the UK. At most, it is sometimes suggested that, at a local level, 
there may be effects on employment, wages and access to public services,36 or that 
because the UK social security system is less contribution based than systems in 
                                                        
32  N Nic Shuibhne, ‘Exceptions to the free movement rules’, in C Barnard and S Peers (eds), 
European Union Law (Oxford University Press, 2014). 
33  Deutsche Bank Research, Research Briefing, Debate on free movement. Does the EU need new 
rules on social security co-ordination?, 20 March 2015 contains a brief review of most of the 
evidence on the alleged welfare magnet effects of free movement, as well as the fiscal 
impacts of EU migrants. See also J Wadsworth, Immigration, the European Union and the UK 
Labour Market, May 2014 Paper No' CEPPA015: 
http://cep.lse.ac.uk/pubs/download/pa015.pdf and Review of the Balance of Competences 
between the United Kingdom and the European Union Single Market:  Free Movement of 
Persons, July 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/consultations/free-movement-of-
persons-review-of-the-balance-of-competences.  
34  See above note 1. Whether or not this trap is of their own making is a different question, on 
which see M Goodwin, ‘Why the "immigration debate" is getting us nowhere’ New Statesman, 
27 November 2013, http://www.newstatesman.com/politics/2013/11/why-immigration-
debate-getting-us-nowhere.  
35  This was a mantra regularly repeated by Labour Party shadow ministers during 2014, such 
as Ed Balls, Yvette Cooper and Dave Hanson: see ‘David Cameron promises 'one last go' at EU 
migration curbs’, BBC News, 16 October 2014, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-
29642604. It is also the terminology used by the IPPR, A fair deal on migration for the UK, 
March 2014, http://www.ippr.org/publications/a-fair-deal-on-migration-for-the-uk and it 
has been picked up by former European Commissioner Laszlo Andor, Fair Mobility in Europe, 
Social Europe, Occasional Paper, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, January 2015, 
http://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/OP7.pdf.  
36  See, for example, the discussion in the Balance of Competences review report above note 33 
at pp 42-45; J. Portes, ‘Labour Mobility in the European Union’ in S Durlauf and L Blume 
(eds), The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, Online Edition, (Palgrave, 2015) at p 9. 
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other EU Member States, this could mandate longer restrictions on in work benefits 
for incoming EU citizen workers.37 Is it fair or unfair to reduce the transaction costs 
of migration, such that - as James Hampshire says - free movement is actually more 
often circular than immigration from third states and thus may have less long-term 
impact upon the host society?38 
 Scholars such as Emma Carmel39 and Regine Paul40 have argued that it is now 
time to end the artificial bifurcation when thinking about migration governance in 
the EU context between, on the one hand, free movement and, on the other hand, 
immigration. While there may exist only a limited set of EU competences and 
measures in relation to immigration from third states, and indeed there are also 
high levels of variation in engagement on the part of the Member States with the 
laws and policies that have been enacted, with Ireland and the UK having opted out 
of many of the relevant measures (except most of those relating to ‘illegal’ 
immigration), none the less the two sets of measures regulate in large measure the 
same set of societal challenges regarding mobility, labour markets and 
inclusion/exclusion. For Carmel, the distinction between (intra EU) mobility and 
(from third country) migration is a distinction without a difference. The two 
phenomena belong together in a continuum of migration governance. She diagnoses 
a lack of reality around free movement at the present time, since ‘Such mobility [i.e. 
free movement] is assumed, at Union level, to either be taking place 
unproblematically or, at most, to require member states’ action to encourage more 
intra-EU mobility to generate liberalising benefits for the EU economy’.41 At the 
present time, these assumptions – which saw the idea of EU free movement 
underpinned by twin logics of market freedom and citizens’ rights42 – can no longer 
be sustained as somehow separate from the logics of immigration under conditions 
of globalisation where similar claims to economic benefit and social progress/equity 
are often made by advocates of (more) open borders. Carmel, along with Paul, 
suggests that instead of the traditional mobility/migration bifurcation we should 
use a detailed set of typologies of the rights and benefits enjoyed (or denied as the 
case may be) by different groups of non-citizen migrants, within a complex 
stratification of interests.43 
 Paul makes the important point that free movement impacts upon labour 
                                                        
37  Open Europe, Open Europe report on reforming EU free movement: Make it fair to keep it free, 
24 November 2014, http://openeuropeblog.blogspot.co.uk/2014/11/open-europe-report-
on-reforming-eu-free.html. 
38  Hampshire, above note 20. 
39  E Carmel, ‘Mobility, migration and rights in the European Union: critical reflections on policy 
and practice’, (2013) 34 Policy Studies 238. 
40  R Paul, Strategic contextualisation: free movement, labour migration policies and the 
governance of foreign workers in Europe’, (2013) 34 Policy Studies 122. 
41  E Carmel, ‘With what implications? An assessment of EU migration governance between 
Union regulation and national diversity’, (2014) 11 Migration Letters 137 at p 140. 
42  E Carmel, ‘European Union Migration Governance: utility, security and integration’ in E 
Carmel, A Cerami and T Papadopoulos (eds) Migration and Welfare in the New Europe: Social 
Protection and the Challenges of Integration (Policy Press, 2011) at p 52. 
43  E Carmel and R Paul, ‘Complex stratification: Understanding European Union governance of 
migrant rights’, (2013) 3 Regions and Cohesion 56. 
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market immigration policies – i.e. vis-à-vis third countries. It is not simply the case 
that states ‘accept’ the lack of control imposed by free movement, and then 
concentrate their regulatory efforts on other forms of immigration alone. Within the 
broader framework of labour market immigration policies they have to respond to 
the specifics of free movement, which typically involves both skilled and unskilled 
mobility. In fact, one could go further and suggest that EU free movement is a 
species of labour market immigration policy, displaying a very distinctive mix of the 
elements that Martin Ruhs suggests we will find in all labour market immigration 
programmes, namely ‘openness, skills and rights’.44 Ruhs has argued that the EU’s 
arrangements for free movement – which allow mobility for work and unrestricted 
access to the work-related aspects of the welfare system – are an important 
exception to the trade-off normally seen in labour immigration policies between 
mobility and rights.45 To that extent, he highlights the political costs of free 
movement, as it may not be universally perceived to be sustainable, especially, one 
might add, in a larger and more diverse European Union. This may account for many 
calls to restrict national welfare states, in the light of free movement. 
 While Paul argues that internal EU free movement and external EU 
immigration are connected, it is perhaps surprising that she seems to adopt an 
assumption that the relationship involves linear and unidirectional policy decisions 
– from (uncontrolled) free movement to (controlled) labour immigration – rather 
than iterative in character. For sure, there is some evidence of that direction of 
influence, especially when we look at the period under review by Paul, namely a 
period when there was quite a high degree of overlap between free movement and 
labour immigration policies as Member States made the choices about whether or 
not to impose transitional restrictions on those states that acceded in 2004 and 
2007, with some doing so and some choosing not to. The evidence seems to show 
that the belief did pertain in the UK for a while that EU workers could take up the 
slack in relation to low skill migration from third countries that was increasingly 
restricted from that time onwards and, moreover, that this would happen with a 
minimum of controversy.46 
 Of course, that is no longer an official or unofficial position in the UK. After 
the post 2010 General Election, the Coalition Government committed itself to reduce 
net migration to less than 100,000 people per annum (including students and EU 
citizens, two groups of migrants that cannot really be ‘controlled’, not to mention 
                                                        
44  M Ruhs, ‘Ten features of labour immigration policies in high-income countries’, 15 January 
2014, http://www.priceofrights.com/blog/post.php?s=2014-01-15-ten-features-of-labour-
immigration-policies-in-highincome-countries#.U-ICGkjQQ70.  For more detail see M. Ruhs, 
The Price of Rights: Regulating International Labor Migration (Princeton University Press, 
2014). 
45  M. Ruhs, ‘Is unrestricted immigration compatible with inclusive welfare states? The 
(un)sustainability of EU exceptionalism’, COMPAS Working Paper No. 125, University of 
Oxford, 2015 with a shorter blog at http://www.priceofrights.com/blog/post.php?s=2015-
06-25-eu-migration-and-welfare-benefits-is-unrestricted-labour-immigration-compatible-
with-an-inclusive-welfare-state#.Va_kVbdzaKA. 
46  Paul above note 40 at p 130. 
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the absence of restrictions on returning UK citizen emigrants).47 It is also no longer 
a view of the Labour Party.48 After the 2015, the Conservative Government quickly 
signalled its intention to push back on the remaining skilled migration from outside 
the EU, with the announcement of a review of the Tier 2 skilled migration route, led 
by the independent Migration Advisory Committee,49 while putting key aspects of 
the treatment of free movement on the table in the negotiations it will lead for a 
putative reform of the EU in the lead up to a UK in-out referendum. Indeed, the most 
interesting question to consider is the extent to which the different dimensions of 
migration governance are co-constitutive, in complex ways, with immigration policy 
impacting as much on free movement as the latter does upon the former. 
 The existence of such a complex interaction between the different elements 
of migration governance is the premise against which this article aims to explore 
some aspects of the relationship between the EU free movement rules and the 
domestic implementation context (comprising the related fields of immigration law 
and welfare law, so far as it relies on sovereignty-based distinctions such as the 
‘right to reside’) in order to help identify how the gap between law and political 
truth has been navigated by domestic political actors. It builds on earlier research 
that used a socio-legal approach in order to bring issues of (legal) culture into focus 
when we think about how and why EU law is or is not effectively applied at the 
national level.50 Central to that work was an understanding of the dissonance 
between immigration law – based on a classic ‘permissions’ approach in which state 
sovereignty is central to how law is shaped and operates – and EU free movement 
law, based on treaty-grounded rights for individuals, including rights of residence, 
the right to non discrimination and procedural rights including access to law and 
legal remedies. The further step to explore in this article is the insight that what may 
be dissonant in legal terms can also be consonant in political terms, posing a 
particular type of Europeanisation puzzle for Member States, a puzzle which is not 
fully captured by any of the classic descriptive or interpretative theories of 
Europeanisation as a process of two way adjustment to membership of the EU,51 or 
presentations of Member States as either ‘leaders’ or ‘laggards’ when it comes to 
compliance with EU law.52 Indeed, it is not entirely clear that the Europeanisation 
                                                        
47  J Salt and J Dobson, ‘Cutting net migration to the tens of thousands: what exactly does that 
mean?’, MRU Discussion Paper, UCL, November 2013, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/news/news-
articles/1113/Salt_Dobson_291013.pdf. 
48  Britain Can be Better, UK General Election 2015 Labour Party Manifesto, pp 49-50. 
49  ‘David Cameron unveils new non-EU migration crackdown’, BBC News, 10 June 2015, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-33082737; Migration Advisory Committee, Call for 
Evidence. Review of Tier 2, July 2015, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/migration-
advisory-committee-mac-review-of-tier-2.  
50  J Shaw, N Miller and M Fletcher, Getting to Grips with EU Citizenship: Understanding the 
Friction Between UK Immigration Law and EU Free Movement Law, Research Report, 2013, 
http://www.frictionandoverlap.ed.ac.uk/files/1693_fullreportlowres.pdf; J Shaw and N 
Miller, ‘When Legal Worlds Collide: An Exploration of What Happens when EU Free 
Movement Law Meets UK Immigration Law’, (2013) 38 European Law Review 137.  
51  For discussion see Shaw and Miller above note 50 at pp 144-145. 
52  T Börzel, ‘Pace setting, Foot dragging, and Fence sitting: Member State Responses to 
Europeanisation’ (2002) 40 Journal of Common Market Studies 193. 
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literature has fully caught up with the dynamics of Euroscepticism, at least in ‘old’ 
Member States such as the UK. 
 So long as the EU exists in its present form, ignoring or misapplying EU law in 
an institutionalised manner cannot be a realistic or long-term option for a Member 
State. The rule of law is deeply embedded in the Union’s DNA and in that context 
Union law draws heavily upon the resource base offered by the constitutional 
systems of the Member States themselves, which are self-evidently grounded in the 
rule of law. There are few overt challenges to this element of the EU, at least not 
over the longer term. One of the most powerful elements in this equation is the 
obligation on national authorities and national courts to apply EU law that turns 
national courts, for example, into ‘EU courts’. Of course, that does not mean that 
compliance is perfect, but it does ensure that in important ways the compliance 
process is embedded internally and constitutionally for these liberal legal states.53 
 The centrality of the rule of law to the EU is a premise generally shared 
between legal scholars, political scientists and scholars of international relations, 
even though they may well approach the significance of law and legal institutions 
within the framework of European integration in different ways. While legal 
scholars may point to the self-evident normative value of the rule of law in liberal 
constitutional systems searching for a basic norm, for scholars of politics and 
international relations the focus often falls on how states stick to their commitments 
precisely in order to ensure that they can retain credibility in the international 
sphere and to ensure reciprocity by their partners. 
 Given this premise, what steps can the government of a Member State take in 
order to achieve as many of its goals as possible in the political sphere and in 
particular appear, at least, to have some semblance of control over the issue of free 
movement? And, conversely, how do other actors (at national and EU level) react to 
these arguments, or present counter-arguments in the context of their political and 
legal mobilisation and litigation strategies? How does the European Commission, in 
its guise as guardian of the treaty framework and of EU law, react to these 
arguments and to the responses of others such as claimants at the national level, or 
political parties that highlight possible future strategies in relation to free 
movement? Finally, can we trace these arguments also into case law, and via that 
loop into proposals to change EU law itself via treaty change or legislative reform? I 
argue in what follows that the discursive construction of a migration governance 
space which brings into question both free movement and immigration is central, at 
least to understanding the strategies pursued by the UK government. 
 
IV. BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICAL TRUTH: A CASE STUDY ON THE UK 
The migration governance space on which we focus in this article is the one in which 
UK governments since 2010 have found themselves. Conservative-led governments 
have identified the challenge of combatting the advances of a populist political 
                                                        
53  D Kelemen, ‘Judicialisation, Democracy and European Integration’ (2013) 49(3) 
Representation 295. 
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party54 (United Kingdom Independence Party/UKIP) and of appeasing apparently 
ever growing negative popular sentiments on immigration, whilst avoiding stepping 
completely outside the parameters of EU law, because this could have substantial 
legal and political costs. This article argues that the UK Government has sought to 
maintain this balance by applying a ‘continuum of migration governance’ approach 
which allows it to make full use of the similarities and differences between EU free 
movement law and national immigration law, whilst speaking in sufficiently 
‘appeasing’ voices to its various, often conflicting, audiences. In large measure, these 
narratives have been adopted not only by the principal government coalition party 
of 2010-2015 and party of government from 2015 onwards (Conservative Party) 
but also by the other large centrist UK-wide party, namely the Labour Party. The 
smaller coalition partner, the Liberal Democrat party, has, by way of contrast, 
generally sustained a more pro-European stance in relation to issues of free 
movement more generally, but largely signed up, by virtue of the Coalition 
Agreement to the 2010 pledge, to the task of ‘managing’ (for which read ‘reducing’) 
immigration, if without the fixation on numbers which proved something of a 
millstone around the neck of the Conservative Party during the Coalition 
Government.55 
 In exploring these strategies, the article sticks closely to the normative and 
narrative resources of the law, for it pays particular attention to the strategic use of 
legal arguments by certain privileged actors, as well as the standard texts of legal 
analysis – treaties, legislative instruments and case law. Of note are the positions 
taken by the government ministers, and by other Conservative Party politicians, as 
not only does the executive get to decide upon most applications made by EU 
citizens but it also has the prerogative of setting the tenor of much debate on EU free 
movement law, even though it is constrained by EU law in how it may act. Other 
political parties (especially the Labour Party and the former coalition partners the 
Liberal Democrats) have responded to this lead, even if they have been trying to 
steer slightly different courses. UKIP, meanwhile, has attempted to set a different 
agenda by rejecting EU free movement as wholly emblematic of a general failure to 
control UK borders that can only be corrected by the country leaving the EU. 
 Also relevant are the responses to the decisions and proposals of the 
executive which come from other stakeholders within the system such as claimants 
and their legal advisors, from the NGO/thinktank sector and from academic 
commentators, from courts (national and EU level) as the formal adjudicators upon 
the relationship between EU law and national law, as well as from EU level actors 
(EU institutions and civil society actors) and actors in other Member States. In the 
context of this argument, formal legal change (legislative change at the EU or the 
national level, and treaty change at the EU level) is seen as one possible output of 
such a dialogic process.  
                                                        
54  M Van Der Vardt, ‘Desperate Needs, Desperate Deeds: Why Mainstream Parties Respond to 
the Issues of Niche Parties’ (2015) 38(1) West European Politics 93. 
55  For a snapshot of Liberal Democrat party policy when junior Coalition partners, see Liberal 
Democrats, ‘Nick Clegg's immigration speech’, 6 August 2014, 
http://www.libdems.org.uk/nick_clegg_s_immigration_speech.  
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 There are, I shall argue, three overlapping sets of strategies that 
governments can pursue when trying to steer a course between remaining ‘rule-of-
law bound’ in relation to free movement law and facing down adverse public 
opinion or electoral responses at the national level, not least by providing a range of 
narratives which feed the interests of different, often competing, audiences. I 
describe this as navigating between ‘law and political truth’.56 The strategies are 
those of: 
 
 Making use of the internal resources of EU law, by exploiting wiggle room, 
uncertainties and complexities within the law as it stands, and competing – 
with other actors – over the proper interpretation of EU law (Section A); 
 Exploiting certain external resources by reading across between national 
immigration law and EU free movement law, emphasising – as noted above – 
the continuum of migration governance (Section B); and 
 Seeking changes in the resources of EU law, by seeking legal change, whether 
unilaterally (e.g. through opt outs) or in partnership with the EU institutions 
and other EU Member States (Section C). 
 
There are fine lines of distinction between the three strategies, and some inevitable 
overlap between them. For example, it is sometimes hard to discern the difference 
between changes the UK introduces which are intended to exploit uncertainties and 
wiggle room, and those that represent the fruits of concerted action amongst the 
Member States. And sometimes exploiting wiggle room precisely means reading 
across the resources of immigration law. So the strategies are not closed categories 
by any means. 
 
A. Exploiting wiggle room and competing over meaning 
Despite (or perhaps because of?) the extensive legislative and judicial activity that 
has occurred in the field of EU free movement law, fundamental uncertainties 
remain. Legal commentators readily acknowledge the point.57 Uncertainties are to 
be found everywhere in the free movement domain: in the EU level measures 
themselves; in the national implementing measures which, in the case of the UK 
(EEA Regulations58) are highly complex;59 in the gaps between the EU measures and 
national implementing measures; in the case law of the Court of Justice. With such 
                                                        
56  This is a paraphrase of D.P. Hodge’s comment that politicians find themselves between 
‘absolute and political truth’ in relation to the ‘trap’ of immigration discourse, bringing in the 
rule of law as an additional element. 
57  Editorial Comments, above note 9 at 733. N Nic Shuibhne and J Shaw, ‘General Report’, in 
Neergaard et al above note 15. 
58  The UK implementation of EU free movement rules explicitly extends all the same rights and 
legal frameworks to citizens of the EEA as well as the EU (i.e. Norway, Iceland and 
Liechtenstein), as well as Swiss citizens. The ‘shorthand’ to cover all these categories is the 
reference “EEA”. 
59  Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006, SI 2006/1003. An unofficial but 
extremely useful copy of the consolidated Regulations is available vai 
http://www.eearegulations.co.uk/Latest/Index. However, this should not be relied upon as 
a legal document. 
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uncertainties, legal and related professionals possessed of ‘internal legal learning’60 
hold a privileged position – courts, government lawyers and advocates, other legal 
professionals (e.g. working for NGOs or thinktanks), and of course legal academics. 
The process of dialogue between these groups is as lively at the EU level as it is in 
any other legal order, and it is even more complex than is the case in the municipal 
setting alone, because of the multi-level and plural nature of the legal system and 
structure of courts involving the EU and its 28 separate Member States. While the 
Court of Justice is the ‘final arbiter’ and authoritative interpreter of EU law, since it 
is given the role under Article 19 TEU to ‘ensure that in the interpretation and 
application of the Treaties the law is observed’, in practice the relations and 
dialogues between the different courts within the complex juridical structure of the 
EU are more complicated than that. Moreover, national data collected for FIDE 
highlight how national judiciaries have had to work hard ‘to discern and to follow 
the twists and turns of jurisprudence-in-progress at EU level.’61 
 Member States will often exploit any uncertainties or space for unilateral 
action in order to restrict free movement rights. Sometimes, states may institute 
new measures, or attempt to develop certain arguments about the meaning of EU 
law, which will not ‘hold’, in the face of the prerogative of the Court of Justice to 
provide an authoritative interpretation of EU law, or indeed in the face of the 
determination of national courts to apply EU law as interpreted by the Court of 
Justice when cases are brought by aggrieved EU citizens. None the less, the 
rhetorical and practical effects of making those arguments may be useful to the 
Member State that makes them, at least in the short term, especially if the approach 
can be seen, perhaps in the national media, as differing from the approach taken by 
the European Commission. 
 The point about the pliability of arguments can be illustrated with interview 
data from earlier research from a legal practitioner respondent who was asked 
about arguments that had been made by various barristers acting on behalf of the 
(then) UK Borders Agency and the Home Secretary,62 in cases before both the 
national and European courts: 
What lies behind [these arguments] is what lies behind any argument led by 
an advocate on behalf of a client. The argument is designed to promote the 
policy interests of the client in a way which has some prospect of success for 
them. What is perhaps interesting from your point of view is that often 
Counsel’s opinion may well be, you are more likely than not to succeed in this 
argument in the domestic courts and when there’s a reference you are very 
likely to lose this argument. The government is often quite content to litigate 
a case on that basis. If you like, ‘get away with it as long as they can’ would be 
one way of putting it, or ‘continuing to assert their different view of the effect 
                                                        
60  M Galanter, ‘In the Winter of our Discontent: Law, Anti-Law, and Social Science’, (2006) 2 
Annual Review of Law and Social Science 1 at p 1. 
61  Nic Shuibhne and Shaw, above note 57Error! Bookmark not defined. at p 149. 
62  The UKBA was replaced in 2013 by UK Visas and Immigration, and the work was taken back 
‘in house’ within the Home Office. 
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of freedom of movement rights in Europe for as long as they can’. [Q35]63 
 Political scientists Michael Blauberger and Susanne Schmidt have discussed 
the impact of uncertainty in relation to the heavily contested topic of access to 
welfare benefits on the part of EU citizens who are without work, or are seeking 
work, or are in low paid work, in the host state. They have argued that 
the interaction of EU legislation and Court re-interpretation … results in 
significant legal uncertainty. … Legal uncertainty poses a challenge for 
member states’ administrations in terms of workload and rule-of-law 
procedures. Domestic legislative reforms shift this uncertainty to EU citizens 
by raising the burden of proof required for these citizens to successfully 
claim social benefits.64 
In what follows, I develop three brief examples that highlight how wiggle room and 
uncertainty are exploited over time within the domain of EU free movement law and 
how the costs of compliance are shifted effectively onto claimants.  
 The first example uses uncertainty generated by judgments of the CJEU 
concerned with the scope of EU citizenship itself, as opposed to the free movement 
rules. In the case of Ruiz Zambrano,65 the Court of Justice held that Member States 
are required to have regard to the interests of EU citizen children, even those who 
have not previously exercised their free movement rights, in order to ensure that 
they are not deprived of ‘the substance of their EU citizenship rights’, e.g. as a result 
of having to leave the territory of the Union. Thus in a case involving a Colombian 
citizen resident in Belgium, with two Belgian citizen children, the state was obliged 
to give a residence (and a work) permit to the third country national parent, in 
order to ensure that the children would receive the care and support that they 
needed as dependents. For the children could not reside independently of the 
parents, and would have been forced to leave had the parents been deported. Many 
Member States were initially hesitant to implement quickly what seemed to be quite 
a dramatic intervention by the Court of Justice in the sphere of national immigration 
law, constraining their capacity to deport a person on the grounds of the EU 
citizenship rights of his or her children, who were resident in the same EU Member 
State as that of which they had citizenship. In fact, subsequent case law66 has 
demonstrated that the ruling may be restricted for the most part to its specific facts 
and may have less resonance than might initially have been thought. The CJEU 
emphasised the exceptional nature of what amounted to an intervention in national 
immigration law, and focused on a threshold of forced departure from the territory 
of the Union, before it could be said that the genuine enjoyment of the substance of 
the rights of EU citizenship could be said to be at risk. Evidence from national courts 
seems to indicate a nuanced approach to the challenges posed by Ruiz Zambrano 
highlighting considerable ‘wiggle room’ for national authorities and challenges for 
                                                        
63  Quotations from interview data collected for the Nuffield Project on Friction and Overlap are 
identified by the same numerical identifiers used in the original research report, above note 
50. 
64  Blauberger and Schmidt, above note 17 at p2. 
65  Ruiz Zambrano ECLI:EU:C:2011:124. 
66  Dereci and Others, Case C-256/11, ECLI:EU:C:2011:734, O and S, Cases 356/11 and 357/11, 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:776. 
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claimants wanting to show that their situation falls within the scope of Ruiz 
Zambrano.67 For example, a series of cases in the Netherlands highlighting a strict 
approach to the question of whether there is no other ‘real’ possibility for the child 
to stay within the territory of the Union other than the granting of a residence 
permit to a third country national carer68 has culminated in another reference to the 
CJEU to ascertain the remit of the Ruiz Zambrano case law.69 Likewise, in the UK, a 
further reference has been made covering in particular the issue of the coincidence 
of a Ruiz Zambrano type case with family breakdown and divorce, involving a third 
country national and an EU citizen from another Member State. 70 
 As is implicit from these developments, it has been possible for the UK to 
limit the ‘Ruiz Zambrano carer’ rights under the amended EEA Regulations to 
circumstances where both parents would be obliged to leave the territory of the 
Union, thus effectively preventing the children from residing there.71 In other words, 
Ruiz Zambrano cannot be the basis for circumventing restrictive national family 
reunion requirements, where one parent is a citizen and the other parent is a third 
country national, and the children are citizens of the state of residence. There has to 
be a threat to the residence of the child on the territory. Furthermore, the UK has 
restricted housing assistance and welfare entitlements for the Ruiz Zambrano 
carers, so that such families (if not in employment) would be restricted only to 
residual protection under s.17 of the Children’s Act, which constitutes minimal 
residual assistance afforded by local authorities.72 The lawfulness of this restriction 
under EU law, as well as the precise operation of the status of Ruiz Zambrano carer, 
including the key question of when the status arises, has been under review before 
the UK courts, with a reference to the Court of Justice to be anticipated in due 
course.73 Meanwhile, of course, claimants continue to carry the burden: of proving 
that they are Ruiz Zambrano carers in the face of a sceptical executive, and of 
sourcing sufficient assistance from the state (if unable for whatever reason to find 
employment) to provide for their children. 
 We turn now to a second example of uncertainty arising in part from the 
language of the Citizens’ Rights Directive. Uncertainties are inevitable given the 
extent to which open-textured language, designed to ensure some degree of 
                                                        
67  See Nic Shuibhne and Shaw, above note 57 at pp141-150.  
68  Noted in J. Langer and A. Schrauwen, ‘The Netherlands’, in Neergaard et al above note 15 at 
705-706. 
69  Case C-133/15 Chavez-Vilchez, pending. 
70  C-115/15 NA (Pakistan), pending. 
71  Immigration (EEA) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2560; see Horsley and 
Reynolds, above note 15 at pp 866-867. 
72  The Allocation of Housing and Homelessness (Eligibility) (England) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2588; The Social Security (Habitual Residence) (Amendment) 
Regulations 2012, SI 2012/2587. 
73  Sanneh v SSWP and others [2015] EWCA Civ 49. See Horsley and Reynolds, above note 15 at 
pp 870-871 for discussion of the same case at an earlier stage of the proceedings. For 
discussion of the Court of Appeal case see D Rutledge, ‘New Zambrano case: Good news and 
bad news for Zambrano carers’, Free Movement Blog, 10 February 2015, 
https://www.freemovement.org.uk/new-zambrano-case-good-news-and-bad-news-for-
zambrano-carers/.  
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responsiveness to the different implementation contexts of 28 Member States, is 
employed within the EU measures and also because immigration as a legal field 
almost invariably contains provisions of great complexity, given the need to provide 
a code for decision-makers. For example, EU citizens who do not have a permanent 
right to reside must not become an ‘unreasonable burden’ (Article 14) upon social 
assistance system of the host state. If they do, they could be removed – although in 
practice there has, hitherto, been relatively little evidence of Member States actually 
removing such EU citizens in large numbers.74 But what is ‘unreasonable’? And what 
are – in the words of the Court of Justice – the ‘genuine and effective chances of 
being engaged’ (in employment),75 which prescribe the right of a person seeking 
employment to remain in the host state (although not necessarily to receive any out 
of work benefits). And what type of process of review must Member States 
undertake to ascertain whether individuals still qualify under the free movement 
rules? 
 The UK has been quite active in this area challenging the extent to which the 
non-discrimination principle protects EU citizens resident in a host state, placing 
substantial burdens on individuals who are sometimes quite vulnerable and often 
have little opportunity to seek recourse to law. It has done so against the backdrop 
of an evolving case law of the Court of Justice on the scope of Member State 
obligations which has suggested that the Court is quite sensitive to the concerns of 
the Member States over so-called ‘benefit tourism’. 76 There has been a series of 
announcements by UK ministers intended to reduce the benefit entitlements of 
mobile EU citizens, ostensibly in order to reduce the ‘pull factor’ (indeed ‘magnetic 
pull’77) apparently exerted by the UK benefits system.78 Since the end of 2013, 
                                                        
74  Perhaps the most high profile example has come from Belgium: see Lafleur and Stanek above 
note 18. For further details on the follow up from the European institutions see 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-122_en.htm (original infringement action) 
and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getAllAnswers.do?reference=E-2014-
000356&language=EN (written Reply by Reding to a parliamentary question). 
75  Antonissen, Case C-292/89, ECLI:EU:C:1991:80. 
76  The November 2014 ruling in Dano v Jobcenter Leipzig, Case C-333/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:2358 confirmed that Member States need not pay a non-contributory social 
security benefit which guarantees a level of subsistence to an EU citizen from another 
Member State who had not entered the country to look for work, and indeed who had never 
worked. It is important to compare this case with the Court’s insistence on the right to equal 
treatment of a person who had been working, who was forced out of the labour market by 
constraints arising from the late stages of pregnancy and the effects of childbirth; that 
person remains a ‘worker’: Saint Prix v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, Case C-
507/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2007. For commentary see H Verschueren, ‘Preventing “benefit 
tourism” in the EU: A narrow or broad interpretation of the possibilities offered by the ECJ in 
Dano?’, (2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 363 and D Thym, The elusive limits of 
solidarity: residence rights of and social benefits for economically inactive union citizens’, 
(2015) 52 Common Market Law Review 17. For a comment on a separate concern that the 
Court of Justice has gone against its own constitutional principles as regards the relationship 
between primary and secondary law in Dano, see N. Nic Shuibhne, ‘State-less’, (2014) 
European Law Review 751. 
77  D. Cameron, ‘We’re building an immigration system that puts Britain first’, Daily Telegraph, 
28 July 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/immigration/10995875/David-
Cameron-Were-building-an-immigration-system-that-puts-Britain-first.html.  
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changes have been made to the length of time that mobile job-seeking EU citizens 
must wait before being able to claim jobseekers’ allowance as a result of 
amendments to the habitual residence test that they must pass, and they have seen 
restrictions to their entitlement to housing benefit and to the period of time during 
which they may claim jobseekers’ allowance, capped initially at six months and then 
subsequently reduced to three months from November 2014 unless they can show 
they have genuine chances of gaining work.79 In addition, the Government has 
introduced a minimum income threshold for EU citizens working in the UK, before 
they are defined as a ‘worker’ in accordance with EU law and before they are able to 
access other ‘in work’ benefits in the UK.80 Some or all of these steps taken by the UK 
Government may fall foul of EU law, and the European Commission may take 
enforcement steps, but as the example of an on-going enforcement action in relation 
to the right to reside test shows,81 what may be most important to the UK 
Government at present may be that it has appeared to be ‘tough’ in the face of 
assumed benefit tourists and also in the face of possible intimidation by ‘Brussels’ 
(i.e. the European Commission). And from our perspective, what is interesting is 
how much it has been able to do by exploiting wiggle room within the existing EU 
regulations including the Citizens’ Rights Directive, the EU Regulation on Social 
Security Coordination,82 and other provisions of EU law guaranteeing the right to 
equal treatment for mobile EU citizens. Sometimes ‘wiggling’ may spill over into 
non-compliance, but there is a grey area between the two that states can exploit. 
 The case of ‘abuse’ demonstrates this point very well. Along with the issue of 
welfare benefits, abuse was one of the topics that dominated the Balance of 
Competences Review report on the free movement of persons.83 The Report 
provides detailed evidence of the UK Government’s oft-articulated concerns about 
abuse and fraud involving non-EU citizens alleged to be taking advantage of EU law 
in various ways in order to circumvent UK immigration law. There is an EU law 
                                                                                                                                                                     
78  Review of the situation by Second Reading, the House of Commons Library Blog, ‘EU 
migrants and benefits: frequently (and some less frequently) asked questions’, 2 December 
2014, http://commonslibraryblog.com/2014/12/02/eu-migrants-and-benefits-frequently-
and-some-less-frequently-asked-questions/.  
79  For details of these changes, see Editorial Comments (note 9 above), M. Evans, ‘Will 
Cameron’s immigration benefit crackdown clash with EU law?’, The Justice Gap, July 2014, 
http://thejusticegap.com/2014/07/will-camerons-immigration-benefit-crackdown-clash-
eu-law/, and E. Sibley and R. Collins, ‘Benefits for EEA migrants’, (2014) 22 Policy and 
Practice 165-171; For a summary of the issue from an EU law perspective, see Freedom of 
Movement and Residence of EU Citizens: Access to Social Benefits, European Parliamentary 
Research Service, In Depth Analysis, June 2014, 
http://epthinktank.eu/2014/06/16/freedom-of-movement-and-residence-of-eu-citizens-
access-to-social-benefits/.  
80  Department of Work and Pensions, ‘Minimum earnings threshold for EEA migrants 
introduced’, 21 February 2014, https://www.gov.uk/government/news/minimum-
earnings-threshold-for-eea-migrants-introduced.  
81  Social security benefits: Commission refers UK to Court for incorrect application of EU social 
security safeguards, IP/13/475, 30 May 2013. 
82  Council and European Parliament Regulation (EC) 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems, [2004] OJ L 166/1. 
83  Balance of Competences Review, above note 33 at pp46-47. 
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basis for this concern, in a broader doctrine of abuse of rights,84 and specifically in 
the Citizens’ Rights Directive. 
 Article 35 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive dealing with abuse provides an 
example of a provision opening up substantial and quite legitimate space for 
competing interpretations. It is worth quoting in full: 
‘Member States may adopt the necessary measures to refuse, terminate or 
withdraw any right conferred by this Directive in the case of abuse of rights 
or fraud, such as marriages of convenience. Any such measure shall be 
proportionate and subject to the procedural safeguards provided for in 
Articles 30 and 31.’ 
Each and every term in this provision can be the subject of conjecture. The UK 
Upper Tribunal case of Papajorgji85 closed off some of the ‘wiggle room’ being 
exploited by the UKBA, by insisting that Entry Clearance Officers (ECOs) examining 
whether to give a EEA family permit (i.e. a visa) to a third country national spouse to 
visit the UK with her EU citizen husband could not effectively put the burden of 
proof on the applicant to demonstrate that her marriage was not a marriage of 
convenience, or a ‘sham’ marriage. The UKUT re-emphasised its point – and its self-
positioning within the orthodoxy of EU law as understood by the European 
institutions as opposed to the UKBA – by reprinting the guidance on sham marriages 
issued by that body as an annex to the judgment, in order to assist ECOs in their 
determinations.86 
 But scope for the UK immigration authorities insisting on the importance of 
the marriage scrutiny process was subsequently reopened by a report from the UK’s 
Independent Chief Inspector (ICI) of Borders and Immigration (the first such report 
by the ICI focusing directly on the ‘European’ casework of the Home Office) warning 
of a significant problem of abuse of the EU rules and their UK implementing 
measures as a result of sham marriages and marriages by proxy.87 In other words, 
the fear is being raised that EU law and its benefits in relation to family reunion are 
being used to evade strict UK immigration controls (income requirements in 
particular) on marriage migration and family reunion. The ICI has reported – and 
indeed this point has also been picked up by the Home Affairs Committee of the 
                                                        
84  This is a principle common to many civil law systems, and it has found a basis in EU law. See 
generally R de la Feria & S Vogenauer (eds), The Prohibition of Abuse of Law – A New General 
Principle of EU Law? (Hart Publishing, 2011). 
85  [2012] UKUT 00038 (IAC). 
86  Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on 
guidance for the better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right 
of citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the 
territory of the Member States, COM (2009) 313 Final. 
87  See An Inspection of the Rights of European Citizens and their Spouses to Come to the UK, 19 
June 2014, http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/European-Casework-Report-Final.pdf. The office of the ICI was 
instituted in 2008 ‘to assess the efficiency and effectiveness of the UK’s border and 
immigration functions’ (http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/about/). It is interesting to 
note that the first inspection report on EU citizens’ rights was not issued under 2014.  
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House of Commons88 – that the problem seems to occur where naturalised EEA 
citizens marry third country nationals (often from the same national or ethnic 
group), although this conclusion seems to be an inference that is drawn from the 
ICI’s inspection of a sham marriage operation,89 rather than a finding based on a 
proper body of evidence.  
 These reports and the other materials will continue to be used by the Home 
Office and by what is now UK Visas and Immigration as justification for a redoubling 
of their scrutiny and control efforts internally and externally. As vindication of the 
current approach, the UK authorities will seize upon the ICI’s finding that over 89% 
of refusals of a family permit based on a belief on the part of the Entry Clearance 
Officer that there was a marriage of convenience were found to be reasonable on a 
review of the evidence during the inspection. That approach includes the 
introduction of additional measures in 2014 penalising those who sponsor or enter 
into sham marriages.90 Such arguments can thus continue to be used in order to 
justify the high rate of refusals of requests for EEA family permits on the part of 
third country nationals married to EU citizens exercising, or wishing to exercise, 
their free movement rights in the UK, and the precautionary approach, arguably in 
violation of EU law, under which the UK authorities continue to require the 
submission of documents which seem to go beyond what is permitted in EU law.91 
 The third and final example of the exploitation of ‘wiggle room’ relates to the 
so-called ‘Surinder Singh route’ within the free movement rules, which concerns the 
extension of the protective scope of ‘free movement’ to cover EU citizens not only 
when they leave their home state to live and work in another Member State, but also 
when they return to their home state. Because of the restrictiveness of national 
immigration law in relation to family reunion, in particular the rather high income 
or savings levels which are required for a family comprising a UK citizen and a third 
country national partner or spouse to enjoy residence together in the UK,92 many 
claimants and their advisers have looked to EU law as a possible avenue for 
achieving reunion by bringing the UK citizen under the protective umbrella of EU 
                                                        
88  See House of Commons Home Affairs Committee, The work of the Immigration Directorates 
(October– December 2013), Third Report of Sessions 2014-2014, HC 237, July 2014. 
89  ICI, A short notice inspection of a sham marriage enforcement operation, 
http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/An-Inspection-of-a-
Sham-Marriage-Enforcement-Operation-Web-PDF.pdf.  
90  Home Office Response, http://icinspector.independent.gov.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2014/06/Home-Office-Formal-Response-to-ICI-Inspection-of-European-
Casework-FINAL.pdf. See the amendments to Regulation 19 and the new Regulations 20B 
and 21B of the EEA Regulations, reprinted at pp64-65 of An Inspection of the Rights of 
European Citizens and their Spouses, note 87 above. 
91  The materials provided at http://eumovement.wordpress.com/2014/08/07/is-uk-
handling-of-eea-family-permit-visas-still-a-problem/ provide an admittedly partial view of 
the matter, but the same issue was reported on the Single Market Scorecard in more 
abbreviated form 
(http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/scoreboard/feedback/concerns/index_en.htm#mainc
ontentSec29).  
92  For the detailed rules on financial requirements as of April 2015, see 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/420154/
Appendix_FM_Annex_1_7_Financial_Requirement.pdf.  
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law. The case of Surinder Singh93 seemed to provide the answer, as it concerned the 
possibility for an EU citizen who had exercised his or her right to free movement to 
rely, when returning to the state of which he or she is a citizen, on the provisions of 
EU law as regards family reunion in order to enable the third country national to 
obtain the right of residence when returning to the UK with the returning UK citizen. 
This approach to navigating the restrictions of national immigration law on family 
reunion has also been quite common in Denmark and the Netherlands which also 
have restrictions on family reunion between citizens and third country national 
spouses. 
 Building on the basics set out in Surinder Singh, the Court of Justice has 
further clarified the conditions under which this right under EU law may be 
exercised in the case of O & B,94 decided in 2014. In her Opinion,95 Advocate General 
Sharpston suggested that the appropriate test regarding the movement of the EU 
citizen to another state would be whether the host state had become where the 
‘habitual centre of his interests lies’ (before the return to the home state). However, 
this test did not meet with the approval of the Court of Justice in its judgment, which 
offered a clearer set of criteria. It referred to a requirement of ‘genuine residence’ in 
the host state, which it interpreted as a minimum period of three months (i.e. 
beyond the initial period of three months to which no conditions apply (Article 7(1) 
of the Citizens’ Rights Directive), but that weekend visits and holiday visits did not 
contribute to this ‘genuine residence’. It also stated the requirement that family life 
should have been created or strengthened during the time spent in the host state. In 
other words, it focused on the relationship, rather than the behaviour of the EU 
citizen, and it did not require some form of ‘integration test’, which is what the 
‘centre of life’ test could be interpreted as being. The Court also made clear that the 
scope of Union law does not extend to cover abuses, where – despite formal 
observance of the requirements of free movement – the purpose of the rules is not 
attained, and there is, second, ‘a subjective element consisting in the intention to 
obtain an advantage from the European Union rules by artificially creating the 
conditions laid down for obtaining it.’96 
 Over the years, the UK has rarely been swift in its implementation of Court of 
Justice case law requiring legal changes at the national level. This is illustrated by its 
conduct after the Metock case which made it clear that the UK could not maintain a 
previous requirement on the third country national family members of EEA citizens 
moving to the UK that they must have been previously resident in another Member 
State with the EEA family member.97 This reluctance to implement has been 
described as ‘heel dragging’ by a practitioner respondent: 
‘So it was very difficult to get anything out of the Agency on Metock and it’s 
an ongoing battle with the Agency...saying to the Agency “You have to have 
from day one, as we did, a working reaction to it and you are sending your 
                                                        
93  Singh, Case C-370/90, ECLI:EU:C:1992:296. 
94  O and B v. Minister voor Immigratie, Integratie en Asiel, Case C-456/12, ECLI:EU:C:2014:135 
95  Delivered jointly in S and G v. Minister voor Immigratie en Asiel, Case C-456/12 and Case C-
457/12, ECLI:EU:C:2013:837. 
96  O and B, ECLI:EU:C:2014:135, para.58. 
97  Metock, Case C-127/08, ECLI:EU:C:2008:449. 
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presenting officers into court, into the tribunal without a clear steer as to 
what they should say. They are standing up in different courts saying 
different things. That’s not their fault they’re being left to make it up as they 
go along but you are one body you need to speak with one voice on this. ... 
There isn’t anything you can do about it, you were wrong. This is the 
position; it’s very clear what should apply”. It was heel dragging...’ [Q36] 
 In stark contrast, the UK was very hasty in its implementation of new rules 
and guidance on the ‘Surinder Singh route’. Regulation 9 of the 2006 EEA 
Regulations was amended with effect from 1 January 2014.98 The amendments were 
laid before Parliament on 5 December 2013 even before the Advocate General’s 
Opinion (12 December 2013) and came into force before the judgment of the Court 
of Justice (12 March 2014). Presaging the terms of the AG’s Opinion, the new 
Regulations implement a ‘centre of life’ test, which also takes into account where the 
principal residence of the EEA citizen is. In a letter responding to a complaint from a 
UK citizen, the European Commission swiftly indicated that it did not see the UK’s 
approach as being in compliance with the CJEU case law, which means that it may 
eventually bring an enforcement action against the UK if it refuses to change its 
rules.99 It is more likely that these will be tested in the UK and European courts in 
cases brought by aggrieved UK citizens and their partners long before any 
enforcement action reaches the Court of Justice, although once again the burden of 
compliance falls effectively on the applicants, not the UK. 
 
B. Reading across: how immigration law seeps into free movement law and 
brings external resources into play 
A major theme of earlier work on the relationship between EU free movement law 
and national immigration law100 concerned the impact of the ‘mindset’ of 
immigration law and those responsible for its application. Immigration law offers a 
framework of narrowly drafted rules, systems of permissions and substantial scope 
for executive discretion premised upon the centrality of national sovereignty in this 
field. This mindset has ‘seeped’ into the field of free movement law, which offers a 
framework of general rules, principles and rights with only very limited scope for 
executive discretion within a structure of shared or pooled sovereignty with other 
Member States, premised on a notion of economic integration and – since 1993 – a 
notion of ‘European’ citizenship. Evidence of how the ‘immigration’ approach, 
especially to the control of borders, influences decision-making on free movement 
can already be seen in the earlier discussion of the approach to EEA family permits 
and so-called sham marriages in the previous section. Indeed, there is a close 
relationship between the two strategies of ‘exploiting uncertainties’ and ‘reading 
across’, although in some cases the reading across of immigration law quite simply 
involves poor decision-making by national authorities which takes into account 
                                                        
98  The Immigration (European Economic Area) (Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, SI 
2013/3032.  
99  Available at http://www.freemovement.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/08/EU-
Commission-letter-anon.pdf.  
100  See above note 50. 
 25 
inappropriate elements which have no place in EU law. 
 Of course, this is not to claim that there is no overlap between immigration 
law and free movement law. There are some fields where Member States are 
explicitly permitted to apply their underlying immigration law in areas which touch 
upon free movement rights. One such example is Article 3(2) of the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive in relation to the admission of extended family members of the EU citizen 
to the host Member State. And nothing prevents Member States from using the same 
administrative and judicial machinery to manage both ‘immigration’ and ‘free 
movement’, as the UK, in common with many Member States, in large measures 
chooses to do.101 Only once the recently adopted Directive 2014/54/EU on 
measures facilitating the exercise of rights conferred on workers in the context of 
freedom of movement for workers102 comes into force in 2016 will the UK and other 
Member States be required to have specific institutions tasked with the role of 
providing assistance to Union workers and members of their families. However, 
earlier research has shown that the impact of immigration law on free movement 
law goes beyond the sharing of institutions, or instances where it is specifically 
permitted. 
 In earlier research, we found in interviews that legal practitioners often felt 
that tests or standards developed within the framework of immigration law – e.g. in 
relation to a person’s poor ‘immigration history’ or in relation to their credibility as 
a witness – were readily carried across into the decision-making and adjudication 
processes in relation to free movement, in places where they did not belong.  
The other situation is, both for the individual who doesn’t know that they’ve 
got EU rights, the [third country national] who’s in a durable relationship 
with a [non-national EU citizen] woman, they [i.e. UKVI] will just turn up on 
the door and arrest them even although the [EU citizen] is in bed with him 
when they arrived. There is no issue about “does this person have a right?” 
rather than “has this person proved that they have a right?” Because of the 
immigration system, the whole onus is on the individual to make out their 
claim rather than it being for the immigration authorities to enquire to how 
long the couple have been living together and what the nature of their 
relationship is before detaining the Indian guy because obviously he might be 
in a durable relationship but their first reaction is “let’s detain him and if he’s 
in a durable relationship then presumably he can make an application”. [Q20] 
 Some interview respondents also suggested that this was a problem in 
judicial decision-making, particularly at the first tier tribunal level: 
If the judge is inclined … to hold someone’s bad immigration history against 
them then they will be wanting to use those categories, that type of 
reasoning, even in a free movement case when it’s not appropriate. It’s not all 
judges by any means but there is [sic] a significant number of judges who will 
be inclined to refuse appeals. You find that in EU law just as strongly as you 
find it in immigration law. [Q21] 
The weight that arguments about the vulnerability of the UK as a destination for 
                                                        
101  This is discussed in more detail in Shaw and Miller, above note 50. 
102  [2014] OJ L128/8. 
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irregular immigration can often carry in political and legal discourse within the UK 
becomes obvious from a review of the 2014 McCarthy case in the Court of Justice, 
along with the precursor ruling in the English High Court when the case was 
referred to the Court of Justice. This case – at both the national and the EU levels – 
saw the UK government continuing to advance the legal argument that it could 
refuse to recognise residence cards issued by (most) other Member States,103 
despite what many believed to be the clear provisions of the Citizens’ Rights 
Directive, and indeed the compliance of almost all Member States with the 
interpretation of the relevant provisions given by the European Commission.104  
 The UK refused to accept that Article 5(2) of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
requires, in the case of third country national family members of EU citizens 
travelling to the UK, that those who held a residence card of another Member State 
must be exempted from any visa requirement, and that this provision and only this 
provision, as implemented in national law, would govern the situation of such family 
members. This meant that it continued to require the Colombian spouse of a 
UK/Irish dual citizen resident in Spain to obtain a so-called ‘EEA family permit’ 
every time she wanted to travel to the UK with her husband. Such EEA family 
permits, which are the UK’s variant on a visa for third country national family 
members of EEA citizens, have a six month duration, and obtaining them meant, for 
this third country national, travelling from the family home in Marbella to the UK 
Embassy in Madrid for a personal interview. Each time she applied, Ms McCarthy 
Rodriguez also had to fill in an extensive form providing ab initio information about 
her family relationship and about her finances. Furthermore, the Home Secretary 
had issued guidance to airlines indicating that failure to ensure that an EEA family 
member boarding a flight to the UK had a valid EEA family permit would attract 
carrier sanctions as per immigration legislation. The McCarthy family sought to 
challenge these arrangements, but brought the case not in the Tribunal but as a 
judicial review action, which meant that it started in the High Court in London. They 
requested that the national court refer the relevant questions of EU law to the Court 
of Justice, on the grounds that the issues remained unclear and could not be 
resolved in the national court without clarification of key questions by the Court of 
Justice. 
 Understood as an attempt to interpret EU law, the judgment of Mr Justice 
Haddon Cave makes interesting reading. The judgment starts off with an extended, 
and almost breathless, consideration of evidence given by the Secretary of State and 
her officials to demonstrate her fears that ‘residence cards’ issued by other Member 
States were entirely unsatisfactory substitutes for UK-issued EEA family permits, 
because of the risk of fraud. The cards issued by almost all Member States did not 
meet international standards for personal documents, said the Home Secretary.105 
However, without access to the full text of the detailed submissions made, it would 
                                                        
103  McCarthy v SSHD, Case C-202/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2450. 
104  See Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights, 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm?locale=en.  
105  Exceptions were the documents issued by Germany and Estonia, and these are accepted by 
ECOs in lieu of an EEA family permit: The Immigration (European Economic Area) 
(Amendment) (No. 2) Regulations 2013, SI 2013/3032.  
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be hard to judge to what extent they were indeed composed of robust evidence, as 
opposed to being mainly assertions based on a relatively thin evidence base.106 
Moreover, no evidence on the same questions seems to have been presented to the 
national court by the applicants, since they concentrated, perhaps unsurprisingly, 
upon the individual effects of the UK’s approach, as opposed to the alleged systemic 
problem. Against that backdrop, the judge professed himself to be persuaded that 
the UK was currently at significant risk because those fraudsters already exploiting 
the route of sham marriage to evade immigration restrictions could shift their 
business into the field of residence card fraud. Accordingly, he concluded: 
There is a palpable risk that a significant proportion of those currently 
engaged in the business of sham marriages etc. would switch to the business 
of fake EU “residence cards” in order to gain illegal access to the UK if such a 
route was open to them. For these reasons, in my judgment, the current 
stance of the UK Government, in refusing to allow EU “residence cards” to be 
used as a waiver to the ‘visa entry’ requirement, is clearly sensible, necessary 
and objectively justified on the facts.107 
 The judge then went on to consider the parties’ submissions on the law, and 
it is perhaps unsurprising that he found on every point in favour of the Home 
Secretary, given his positive engagement with the evidence that had been led on her 
behalf about the scope of the threat from fraud. The issue was whether the UK could 
find some justification for continuing to refuse to recognise residence cards issued 
by other Member States and to insist that family members of EEA nationals obtain 
EEA family permits. He concluded that Article 35 of the Citizens’ Rights Directive 
could be used not only to justify action against an individual thought to be abusing 
his or her rights under EU law, but also to justify a generalised policy of refusing to 
accept certain documents because of a systemic risk of abuse – but he did so without 
considering any of the EU law materials concerned with abuse of rights which focus 
on individual not systemic risk.108 Given his findings on the evidence, he was clearly 
prepared to accept that there was such a systemic risk. Until the position changed at 
the EU level (i.e. to force the Member States to issue fraud-proof residence cards), 
the judge found that it was ‘reasonable, proportionate and necessary for the UK 
                                                        
106  Additional evidence about the concerns of the UK government in relation to abuses of free 
movement rights can be discerned from the Balance of Competences Review Report on free 
movement (above note 33) and from evidence submitted to the European Commission 
following a request from that body that allegations of a problem of fraud and abuse should 
be backed up by evidence (Evidence submitted by the Home Office to the European 
Commission, Free Movement Rights – Initial Information for the European Commission (UK) 
(2014) and Evidence of Fraud and Abuse of Free Movement in the UK (2014)) published by the 
European Scrutiny Committee of the House of Commons 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-
xxviii/8306.htm), which also commented – like the Commission – that the UK’s evidence 
tended to be qualitative, rather than quantitative in nature: European Scrutiny Committee - 
Thirty-First Report, January 2014, at para 2.13 
(http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201314/cmselect/cmeuleg/83-
xxviii/8305.htm).  
107  McCarthy v SSHD [2012] EWHC 3368 (Admin), at para 60. 
108  For example, see Emsland-Stärke, C-110/99, EU:C:2000:695, paras 52 and 53.  
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Government to require all non-EEA family members to obtain prior entry 
clearance’.109 He furthermore found that Protocol No. 20 permitting the UK to 
maintain its border controls was a broad and permissive document which 
‘effectively sweeps EU law aside as an obstacle to the exercise of the [the UK’s] 
discretion’ in relation to controls to be applied at frontiers.110 But despite having 
made those findings, Haddon Cave J decided that his conclusions did not satisfy the 
‘acte clair’ test of ‘no real doubt’ that he set himself with regard to the interpretation 
of EU law necessary for the purposes of reaching a final judgment. Accordingly, he 
went ahead and submitted a reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of 
Justice on whether the UK’s position was lawful having regard to Article 35 of the 
Citizens’ Rights Directive and Protocol No. 20. In view of the learned judge’s 
somewhat scattergun approach to EU law, this conclusion came as something of a 
relief. 
 As befitted its significance and novelty, the case was heard by the Court’s 
Grand Chamber. To put it another way, while informed EU law opinion was doubtful 
about both the case put forward by the UK Government and by the ruling of Mr 
Justice Haddon Cave, none the less there was no authoritative ruling of the Court of 
Justice on which to draw and these are certainly important and sensitive matters, 
and one was now needed. Both the Court and – before it – the Advocate General 
reached opposite conclusions on EU law to those put forward by Haddon Cave J. The 
Court concluded as preliminary point that the Citizens’ Rights Directive was 
applicable, even though McCarthy concerned an EU citizen entering a Member State 
of which he was a citizen with his third country national family spouse, but from a 
state (Spain) where he had exercised his right of free movement. That meant that 
both Mr McCarthy and Ms McCarthy Rodriguez were ‘beneficiaries’ under the 
Directive, and hence able to benefit from Article 5, which exempts third country 
national who have a residence card from the need to hold a visa. 
 As to possible restrictions on entry, the Court pointed out that these were 
only possible under Article 27 (public policy, public security and public health 
grounds) or under Article 35 (abuse of rights). In both cases, the Court emphasised 
that the refusal to allow the third country national to enter the territory of the 
Member State must be based on an individual assessment of risk, or fraud, and must 
not be part of a systematic policy, even if justified by an alleged systemic risk. The 
Court emphasised how the Directive confers rights on an individual basis, with 
redress against a denial of those rights possible under the provisions of the 
Directive in accordance with procedural safeguards. Thus without an individual 
examination of the case, a Member State could not deny the right to enter its 
territory of the third country national family member of an EU citizen, holding the 
residence card of a Member State. In the absence of a specific provision in the 
Directive making provision for such a systematic denial of rights, a Member State 
could not simply rely on what it regarded as a pattern of abuse, without enquiring 
into individual cases. 
 The Court reached a parallel conclusion in relation to the powers left to the 
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UK under Protocol 20, so far as concerned the control of the UK frontiers. The 
provisions in question merely allow the UK to take such measures as are necessary 
to ensure that persons entering the UK have a right to do so under EU law (just as 
the Schengen states similarly have such a right if border controls are temporarily 
reinstated for any reason, as happens quite regularly). This means checking whether 
persons in the situation of Ms McCarthy Rodriguez are in possession of the 
documents mentioned by Article 5 of the Directive (i.e. passport and either visa (if 
required) or residence card). The UK can check the authenticity of individual 
documents. It cannot refuse to recognise an entire class of documents. The Court did 
not refer to the reasoning of the national judge, but one can only imagine what it 
thought of his argument that Protocol 20 simply ‘sweeps away’ EU law replacing it 
with a national right to control the frontiers. 
 The judgment was not welcomed by the UK government, which professed 
itself to be ‘disappointed’.111 Newspaper coverage of the judgment was predictably 
unclear, much of it confusing the issue of entry and the question of residence.112 The 
ruling provided an opportunity for UKIP to attack the Government on the grounds of 
the laxness of EU law relating to residence permits.113 A first reaction by UKVI114 
indicated that the government wished to wait for the national court ruling in the 
case before implementing the ruling in full, and that it would be inclined to take a 
narrow perspective on the ruling, limiting it to its facts where an EU citizen resides 
in a country of which he or she is not a national, where the third country national 
has been issued with a residence card in that state, and where the third country 
national is travelling with, or to join, the EU citizen in the UK. In fact, the UK did 
quite rapidly, and in a low key manner, implement the judgment through a further 
round of amendments to the 2006 Regulations, extending the previous exemption 
given to holders of German and Estonian residence cards to holders of residence 
cards issued by any EU Member States.115 However, it did so in the most restrictive 
way possible by limiting the recognition of residence cards only to those issued by 
Member States under EU law. Thus third country nationals residing with their 
family members in the Member State of which the EU citizen is a national, and 
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holding residence documentation issued under national law, will continue to need 
EEA Family Permits if they visit the UK with the EU citizen family member. We 
remain a long way away from the mutual recognition of national immigration 
documentation which might ease the burden for third country nationals moving 
within the EU – except in cases where the EU’s Long term Residence Directive (from 
which the UK and Ireland are opted out) applies.116 
 The ‘read across’ from immigration law is also visible in the impact of the 
increasing bureaucratic procedures that the UK imposes on those seeking to rely on 
their EU treaty rights. In January 2015, the Home Office introduced a 129 page form 
(subsequently extended to 137 pages, and then reduced in July 2015 to 91 pages, 
plus guidance notes),117 replacing a previous 35 page form, for family members of 
EEA citizens wishing to apply for residence cards (third country nationals) or 
registration certificates (EEA citizens). Such a form is bound to have a dissuasive 
effect on some applicants submitting applications for registration certificates or 
residence cards, and equally will lead to many rejections because of the complexity 
of the questions leads applicants to make mistakes. Some of these rejections will be 
challenged, quite probably successfully, because of the disproportionate and 
intrusive nature of the UK demands, or because the decision-making process was 
flawed. Even more frequently, refusals lead to repeated applications, with additional 
costs for applicants. Ironically subsequent government guidance has confirmed that 
the use of the form is not compulsory.118 However, it would be a brave immigration 
lawyer who advised her client not to bother using the form. One immigration 
commentator and campaigner described the introduction of this form as amounting 
to the transference of the ‘hostile environment’,119 which was promised as a means 
of keeping immigrants on the ‘straight and narrow’, into the sphere of EU free 
movement as well.120 In that sense, the legal dissonance of EU free movement law 
and UK immigration law which strikes the legal scholar on first examination of the 
relationship between the two fields of law appears to have been entirely washed 
away by a high degree of political consonance between the two areas, when the 
perspective and approach of the UK authorities is examined in detail. 
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C. Changing the terms of the debate and creating new legal resources: seeking 
legal change 
The third strategy that governments pursue in order to navigate a course between 
law and political truth is that of seeking legal change. In this section, we focus on 
legal change that would require action at the EU level, including some sort of 
concerted effort on the part of the Member States. Examples of solely domestic 
change were already highlighted in Section A. Legal change includes legislative 
reform, treaty reform and also efforts to persuade the Court of Justice to change the 
tack of its case law. 
 One example of the latter would be the progressively narrower 
interpretations that the Court has given to scope of its ruling in the Ruiz Zambrano 
case, noted in Section A. These may have come in the wake of domestic criticism of 
this judgment. Such a retrenchment may limit the need for domestic changes as a 
result of what were initially seen as radical developments of EU citizenship 
principles by the Court of Justice.121 It has also been argued that the Court of Justice 
has, through its judgment in Dano allowing Member States to refuse to give benefits 
to mobile EU citizens who do not have a right of residence under any of the 
categories provided for in the treaties or legislation, implicitly overruled the earlier 
judgment in Brey122 concerning the obligations on Member States in limited 
circumstances to give social assistance benefits to EU citizens.123 As has often been 
noted, judges do read newspapers, and are not impervious to arguments either that 
EU law has become overstretched, or that their rulings have created untoward 
difficulties at the national level. In fact, changes to the terms of EU law because of a 
shift in Court of Justice case law is by far the most common example of legal change 
at the EU level. 
 Other types of changes would be those that could be brought about as a 
result of amendments to the EU level implementing rules such as amendments to 
the terms of Directive 2004/38 (which would require a qualified majority vote at 
the level of the Council of Ministers and the support of the European Parliament). 
Some of the changes that have been put on the agenda would, however, require 
treaty amendments (whether via the full or a simplified treaty amendment process), 
which in turn would require unanimous consent of the Member States and domestic 
ratification in accordance with national constitutional provisions, and thus much 
more complex and potentially expensive legal processes at both the EU and national 
levels, as well as the political costs that are associated with such change. 
Understandably, legal scholars sometimes disagree about what could be achieved by 
legislative change and what might require treaty change. It is important to note, of 
course, that any attempt to exempt the UK alone from the effects of free movement 
law would definitely require the unanimous assent of all Member States, as it would 
involve a change to the primary treaty level rules, just as other opt outs have been 
enshrined in previous treaties and protocols. Moreover, opening up the treaties to 
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some amendments would surely lead to a wider set of demands for changes from 
Member States that hold objections to other aspects of EU law, and which would 
place these on the table as bargaining counters against any changes to EU free 
movement rules favoured by the UK. 
 The backdrop to debates about legal change in the UK is provided by the 
Review of the Balance of Competences,124 which was foreseen in the 2010 Coalition 
Agreement between the Conservative Party and the Liberal Democrats.125 The 
Review was launched by the then Foreign Secretary William Hague in July 2012. 
Organised in a series of waves or ‘semesters’, evidence was invited, consultations 
with stakeholders organised, reviews prepared within government, with different 
departments taking the lead, and reports then published. Most of the reports were 
published in the same sequence as they were commissioned. The report on the Free 
Movement of Persons126 was not published as expected with the second wave of 
reports, in February 2014, but was held over until the third ‘semester’, and 
published finally in July 2014. Rumours abounded about the delays, with the press 
suggesting that its conclusions were challenged internally by Ministers, especially 
Home Secretary Theresa May, on the grounds that they were too positive about the 
benefits of free movement, and did not dwell sufficiently on the purportedly 
negative aspects.127 
 The rumours were largely confirmed some time after the publication in July 
2014, when a Liberal Democrat Coalition Minister (Lord) William Wallace was 
quoted in The Observer: 
On the free movement of labour report Home Office spads [special advisers] 
tried to remove nearly every reference to credible pro-free movement 
organisations like the EEF [Engineering Employers Federation] and the CBI, 
while stuffing the document with quotations from Migration Watch. They 
worked very hard to obstruct the use of evidence on the balance between 
inward and outward flows, including offering an estimate for the number of 
UK citizens living and working in other EU countries that was half a million 
lower than any otherwise-accepted figure.128 
 In fact, the final report is on the whole a balanced and reasonable 
examination of the complex field of free movement of persons. As with the other 
reports, the report does not articulate a wholesale clamour for a transfer of powers 
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back to the UK. Moreover, none of the reports offers evidence as to what a 
renegotiation of the terms of the UK’s membership of the EU might involve. A first 
assessment of the reports came from House of Lords Select Committee on the 
European Union, which read the reports as they came out, and wrote back to the 
Minister for Europe on each occasion with some initial thoughts. In relation to the 
third tranche of reports, which included the one on the free movement of persons, 
the Committee commented, inter alia in relation to that report, that ‘We found those 
produced for the third semester to be largely balanced and evidence-based. We 
sensed a greater tendency, though, for the Government position and or particular 
Government negotiation achievements to be highlighted.’129 
 The members of the Committee were particularly unhappy at the failure of 
reports to make sufficient use of their own much praised work, although this was 
not a criticism directed towards the report on the free movement of persons. 
However, the Committee was concerned about the evidence base for that report: 
While the range of stakeholders who submitted evidence to the Free 
Movement of Persons report was impressive, there was significant reference 
in Chapter 3 to evidence submitted by Demos and Open Europe, evidence 
which was closely aligned with the position of the UK Government. This is 
particularly surprising in the light of your [i.e. the Minister’s] explanation to 
us that one reason for the severe delay in publishing the report was the need 
to gather a stronger, more up-to-date, evidence base. 
 The point is echoed by the commentary produced on the Review process and 
outputs by a team coordinated by the Brussels-based thinktank, the Centre for 
European Policy Studies. This commentary notes with relief that ‘The report on free 
movement presents a far broader range of facts and analysis on this sensitive topic 
than is usually in evidence in Britain’s debate on Europe.’130 It notes that the Report 
goes on to consider some sensible and perhaps conceivable reforms around social 
security issues reflecting the greater diversity of an EU of 28 Member States. 
However, the commentary on the Review concludes: 
The Review’s concluding passages lend conspicuous weight to the views of a 
single expert [David Goodhart, of Demos], who considers the UK’s opening to 
Central and Eastern Europe in 2004 an historical error, arguing that free 
movement has dangerously unbalanced Britain’s social contract. He argues 
that EU rules need to be re-cast to allow preference to be given to native 
workers in certain instances; that transitional arrangements for allowing 
new EU members access to Britain’s labour market need to be based on more 
flexible criteria such as income disparity and economic convergence; and 
that governments should be free to impose caps on inward EU migration.131 
 The House of Lords Select Committee also conducted a short inquiry into the 
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Review at the beginning of 2015,132 culminating in a Report published in March 
2015.133 The Select Committee Report focused on two concerns: while the 
publication of the reports and the evidence submitted to the Review was to be 
welcomed, the Government had failed to draw out a synthesis of findings, and thus 
to make the material more readily available for a wider audience which would be 
eager to hear more fully reasoned argument about the pros and cons of the UK’s EU 
membership than is generally presented in media and political debates. The second 
concern returned to the issue of evidence. The Committee quoted with approval 
Thomas Horsley’s evidence to the Committee on this question, namely that ‘any 
impression that these reports might have been doctored by political actors 
undercuts some of the real value they should have’.134 
 While acknowledging that point, it is important to see the Review of 
Competences in a broader political context in which, in the case of the free 
movement of persons, the feasible options for reform and renegotiation have been 
gradually narrowed down, while a number of stakeholder audiences, including the 
UK’s fellow Member States as well as domestic political actors, have been the 
recipients of key messages. The range of audiences for proposals for EU level change 
is certainly greater than in respect of the exploitation of uncertainties or wiggle 
room, discussed in Section A, which is primarily aimed at domestic audiences. Many 
of the initial suggestions floated for reform concentrated on importing ‘immigration’ 
approaches into the field of free movement.135 There were proposals to impose 
quotas on EU citizen workers, to require a points-based system in order to eliminate 
much mobility by low-skilled or semi-skilled workers (or those prepared to be 
employed in such posts regardless of their skill or qualification level), and to allow 
for the possibility of an ‘emergency brake’ should Member States find that their 
domestic labour markets are being badly disturbed as a result of very high 
migration flows. All of these options were put forward, mostly informally, by a 
variety of actors,136 although not by government ministers themselves – or at least 
not in public. Reactions to these ‘kite-flying’ exercises emerged – sometimes 
publicly, sometimes ‘by attribution’ – from other Member States and the EU 
institutions. For example, German Chancellor Angela Merkel was ‘reported’ as 
stating that she would prefer the UK to exit the EU than for the free movement of 
persons – a cornerstone of the EU’s single market – to be effectively eliminated by 
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measures such as quotas.137 Commission President José Manuel Barroso was less 
circumspect, with his negative reaction to quotas or similar being made in public.138 
 A cautious appraisal of Cameron’s options also came in October 2014 from 
the think-tank Open Europe,139 which is known to be sympathetic to the idea of 
renegotiation, but which has long warned that opting out of free movement 
altogether must necessarily mean leaving the European Union.140 Indeed, it had 
previously issued a set of proposed reforms for EU free movement that moved away 
from the immigration sphere towards the welfare sphere. It argued that these could 
largely be achieved by means of legislative amendment, not requiring treaty 
amendment.141 These proposals (via a new Directive on Citizenship and Integration) 
focused on prioritizing the access to the welfare state by national citizens over EU 
citizens, requiring a longer period of work and residence in the host state on the 
part of the latter (three years) before either out of work or in work benefits would 
be available. While EU citizen children could access childcare and schooling, 
healthcare costs for the first three years would be borne by the home state, not the 
host state. In addition, national laws protecting the domestic labour force from the 
effects of the exploitation of migrant labour would be ring-fenced from most of the 
effects of EU law, except the principle of non-discrimination. All of this is intended to 
offset what the paper suggests are the ‘contradictions, inconsistencies and perverse 
incentives created by existing EU law on free movement and citizenship’.142 
 Press reports made clear that Open Europe’s suggestions were being taken 
very seriously by Number 10,143 in the preparation of a major speech delivered at 
the end of November 2014 by Prime Minister David Cameron setting out his (i.e. his 
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party’s) negotiating options for free movement.144 It was obvious that the speech 
itself drew on Open Europe’s work in focusing on the so-called ‘pull factors’ and 
incentives for free movement which are not seen as fair towards a country such as 
the UK, and in the question and answer session with journalists which followed, 
Cameron cited Open Europe’s research and described the evidence as ‘pretty 
compelling’. Cameron effectively made the reform of free movement one of the 
centrepieces of the proposed renegotiation which would occur in the event of a 
Conservative Party victory in the May 2015 General Election, declaring changes to 
the welfare arrangements to be an ‘absolute requirement’.145 In other words, failure 
to deliver on elements of reform that would convince a sceptical press as well as 
many eurosceptical members of his own party would push him towards having to 
advocate the UK’s withdrawal from the EU in the promised in/out referendum. 
However, by that stage those elements of the strategy that represented a direct 
attack on the principles of free movement had been dropped, in favour of a focus on 
welfare benefits for low income earners. 
 The key planks of Cameron’s speech have been subject to review and further 
scrutiny, not only by Open Europe, which unsurprisingly found much to be happy 
about,146 but also by critical commentators such as Steve Peers, who reached that 
conclusion that much more would require treaty amendment than Open Europe 
suggested.147 With treaty amendment, the calculus changes, in terms of support 
from other Member States. In fact, the proposals are not limited to the welfare 
sphere, but do still contain further efforts to read across immigration principles into 
the area of free movement, which draw direct inspiration from the strategies of 
resistance described in the previous two sections. They include restrictions on in 
and out of work benefits for EU citizens for four years after arrival, removal of 
jobseekers if they do not find work after six months, the requirement that 
jobseekers should have a job offer before moving to the UK (which seems to 
contradict the previous proposal), removing the payment of child benefit in respect 
of children residing in a different state,148 and a raft of restrictive measures on the 
entry of third country national family members, on the deportation of EU citizen 
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offenders, and on the removal of rough sleepers and beggars. 
 It is sometimes difficult to untangle Cameron’s proposals into those that are 
new, and those that are already underway, such as the removal of taxpayer support 
from jobseekers.149 This is also true in respect of action against homeless and 
destitute EU citizens, where substantial new measures have already been 
introduced. A new Regulation 21B was added to the 2006 EEA Regulations with 
effect from 1 January 2014,150 providing that those EU citizens who have been 
subject to removal under administrative powers on the grounds that they had no 
right of residence (e.g. because they had become homeless or were begging) can be 
precluded from returning to the UK for twelve months unless they can show that 
they are genuinely exercising treaty rights. It remains to be seen whether these new 
rules will be successfully challenged under EU law, given that EU law makes it clear 
that expulsion cannot be the automatic consequence of recourse to the welfare 
system of the host state and that a person must not be expelled if he or she is a 
workseeker with genuine chances of being engaged. Furthermore, at first sight re-
entry bans seem to fall foul of Article 15(3) of the Directive which states that such 
bans can only be imposed if the expulsion was for some justified reason of public 
policy, public health or public security. Does Regulation 21B operate as a re-entry 
ban? One can assume that what Cameron proposes would be collective action at the 
EU level to permit such measures to be taken, which would render the question of 
whether the new UK measures comply with EU law no longer relevant. 
 Whatever the prospects for Cameron’s menu of options being adopted at the 
EU level, they have actually been most successful at setting the terms of debate quite 
at the national level, with – for the most part – Labour and Liberal Democrat 
proposals and manifestos shadowing much of Cameron’s restrictive rhetoric on 
welfare benefits, if not on the issue of administrative removals and re-entry bans.151 
This has been followed by a widespread political consensus, in the wake of the 
Conservative victory in the 2015 General Election, that an in-out referendum should 
be held. Thus we may soon need to consider the even more uncertain question of 
what would happen in the event of a UK in/out referendum leading to a vote to 
depart the EU, such as the impact upon the status of other EU citizens in the UK and 
of UK citizens resident in other Member States. 
 But until such time, it is important to note that by contrast with the measures 
discussed in Sections A and B, of course, the proposals considered in this section are 
just that – proposals. They do not directly change the terms of the legal status for EU 
citizens, although they can and do affect the tenor of the political debate, especially 
if they are thought of as fostering some sort of race to the bottom, involving ever 
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greater stigmatisation of EU citizen migrants.152 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
The main aim of this article has been to provide a three way typology of how states 
navigate the gap between ‘law and political truth’. This has helped us to understand 
more about how EU law applies in the UK, complementing earlier work on 
understanding some of the legal cultural reasons for why there remains this 
dissonance. This work highlights that Europeanisation is not just either a legal or a 
political phenomenon. On the contrary, it has to be seen via the interplay between 
the restrictions of law, and the possibilities of politics (or perhaps vice versa). 
 But the significance of how states navigate between the rule of law and 
political contingencies is not just a point for scholarly reflection. It is equally well 
understood by the ‘consumers’ of free movement law, such as Sean McCarthy, whose 
wife was repeatedly forced to travel to Madrid to obtain an EEA family permit, 
despite having a residence card issued by the Spanish authorities:153 ‘As a British 
national I had expected my country to play by the rules, and now the court has 
finally forced the UK to respect British and European citizens' free movement 
rights’.154 
 Furthermore, in the light of the increasingly contentious politics of EU free 
movement, some commentators have warned that the ‘read across’ between EU free 
movement law and national immigration law can have profoundly negative 
consequences for those who rely upon EU law: 
Politicisation may be defined as the making of a clearly-designated status 
precarious and ambiguous and the creation of noise and doubt that disrupts 
a taken-for-granted institutional reality and thus makes it susceptible to 
renegotiation. In official discourses in certain Member States, EU citizens 
became again “migrants” or “foreigners,” and political parties on the right of 
the political spectrum did not hesitate to embark upon political campaigns 
advocating the restriction of EU mobility.155 
Indeed, many of the proposals discussed in Section C, as well as the practices 
discussed in Sections A and B will, or already have, rendered EU citizens and their 
families more vulnerable, not least because they seem to open the door to 
inappropriate or poor decision-making. We continue to need more research on how 
these restrictions operate in practice, and what new risks are engendered.156 It is 
not surprising that some would argue that ‘strengthened European citizenship’ is 
                                                        
152  A. Ghimis, ‘Unconfirmed but still feared: the tidal wave of Bulgarians and Romanians one 
year later’, EPC Commentary, 15 January 2015, 
http://www.epc.eu/pub_details.php?cat_id=4&pub_id=5192. 
153  See above at note 103. 
154  ‘European court gives UK visa direction’, BBC News, 18 December 2014,  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-30528189. 
155  T Kostakopoulou, ‘Mobility, Citizenship and Migration in a Post-Crisis Europe’, Imaginging 
Europe, June 2014, p 5. 
156  For some of the first results of a research project that aims to fill this gap, the EU Rights 
Project http://www.eurightsproject.org.uk see C. O’Brien, ‘The pillory, the precipice and the 
slippery slope: the profound effects of the UK’s legal reform programme targeting EU 
migrants’, (2015) 37(1) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 111. 
 39 
the best response to the current challenges, not a defensive approach that accepts as 
the appropriate terms of the debate the widespread elision of immigration and free 
movement.157 It has been suggested that the choice to term mobile EU citizens 
‘migrants’ in itself has the effect of stigmatizing them, of blurring the picture with 
regard to the law, and of decreasing their rights.158 
 It is easy to see how some of the measures recently introduced in the UK 
have created the conditions of a ‘perfect storm’, threatening the effective enjoyment 
of EU free movement rights. The implementation of the ‘genuine prospects of work’ 
test, introduced in 2013, sees the removal of access to benefits from workseekers, 
e.g. those who have been made unemployed after a period of employment and even 
after quite long residence in the UK. That in turn can lead to homelessness and 
rough sleeping, as those without benefits cannot afford their rent. In turn, homeless 
persons may be summoned to meet with the Home Office and advised that they do 
not qualify under the EU free movement rules.159 Some are subject to administrative 
removal, and will be served with what may amount to a re-entry ban under 
Regulation 21B.160 The relative ease with which a challenge was brought against the 
application of these removal provisions in 2011 on behalf of a Czech citizen resident 
in the UK, with support from the AIRE centre, seems unlikely to be repeated with 
the formalisation of the ‘GPOW’ test.161 Furthermore, an increased criminalisation of 
vagrancy can also have an impact, as a form of summary justice in the form of the 
so-called “Operation Nexus”. This involves the police and immigration enforcement 
authorities and may see more EU citizens targeted for removal in a variety of 
circumstances where their removal can be said to make the UK ‘safer’.162 
 There presently seems to be little scope in the UK debate for radical counter 
proposals to strengthen EU citizenship to gain traction, such as those coming from 
the European Citizens Action Service to turn the Citizens’ Rights Directive into a 
regulation, thus making it a more effective – and directly applicable – EU 
instrument.163 For the time being, the strengthening of EU free movement rules in 
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the UK will continue to rely, as it has in large measure for many years, on the 
complex interplay between judges, decision-makers, litigants and their lawyers, and 
the civil society actors and academics who comment on these matters. 
 
 
 
 
 
